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“What is the chief end of man? – to get rich. In what way? –
dishonestly if we can, honestly if we must.”
—Mark Twain
“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman.”
—Justice Louis D. Brandeis
INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 2013, Bloomberg published an article exposing a
practice by which traders for the world’s biggest international banks
colluded to manipulate the benchmark for foreign currency exchange
rates for their own profit.1 The article explained, “[t]he behavior
occurred daily in the spot foreign-exchange market and has been
going on for at least a decade, affecting the value of funds and
derivatives.”2 The foreign currency exchange (forex or FX) market is
the biggest market in the world, with a daily turnover rate of $5.3
trillion as of April 2013.3 Yet, there is “no single global body to police

1. See Liam Vaughan, Gavin Finch & Ambereen Choudhury, Traders Said to
Rig Currency Rates to Profit Off Clients, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2013, 7:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-11/traders-said-to-rig-currencyrates-to-profit-off-clients [https://perma.cc/Q3AJ-R9GW].
2. Id.
3. BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 85TH ANNUAL REPORT: 1 APRIL 2014-31
MARCH 2015, at 85 (2015). The manipulated benchmark rates “are used as
settlement values for currency derivatives . . . meaning that they largely determine
the value of instruments worth some $3.3 trillion in daily trading. About two trillion
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the massive 24/7 forex market.”4 “The FX market is like the Wild
West,” according to a trader who spent twelve-years working at
banks.5
For two years investigations of this accusation went on, with the
market unsure of how to proceed.6 Although the investigation is still
continuing, it has so far resulted in over $10 billion in fines for seven
of the world’s largest financial institutions,7 four banks pleading guilty
to violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,8 and over thirty of the
banks’ top traders being fired, suspended, or put on leave.9 The
investigation has sparked unprecedented regulatory scrutiny on the
foreign currency exchange market.10
The impact of foreign exchange benchmark rates on urban
economies is profound. According to Joseph Gold, former General
Counsel of the International Monetary Fund, “for most countries,
there is no single price which has such an important influence on both

dollars more is traded in the ‘spot’ market.” Andrew Verstein, Benchmark
Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 235-36 (2015).
4. Roger Aitken, Forex Market Regulation: Who Can Really Police This Global
FORBES
(Aug.
11,
2014,
10:25
AM),
Market?,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2014/08/11/forex-market-regulation-whocan-really-police-this-global-market/.
5. Vaughan, Finch & Choudhury, supra note 1.
6. See Richard Willsher, Why FX Needs Better Policy Synchronization and
E-FOREX
MAG.
(April
2015),
Trading
Transparency,
http://www.fxspotstream.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/e-forex-April-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QEE2-3DX6] (“Uncertainty over the future course of regulation
and whether more trading malpractice may come to light are continuing to cloud the
foreign exchange market.”).
7. Karen Freifeld, David Henry & Steve Slater, Global Banks Admit Guilt in
Forex Probe, Fined Nearly $6 Billion, REUTERS (May 20, 2015, 6:28 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-forex-settlementidUSKBN0O50CQ20150520 [https://perma.cc/6PFQ-FUGE].
8. Antoine Gara, Four Banks Plead Guilty to Foreign Exchange Collusion, UBS
Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud, FORBES (May 20, 2015, 11:12 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2015/05/20/four-banks-plead-guilty-toforeign-exchange-collusion-ubs-pleads-guilty-to-wire-fraud/#1ece824c48cd
(explaining that a fifth bank, UBS, was granted immunity because of its cooperation
in the FX investigation, but accepted a guilty plea to wire fraud for its violation of a
non-prosecution agreement in connection with its involvement in manipulating
LIBOR rates in 2012).
9. Suzi Ring & Hugo Miller, UBS Traders May Be First to Face Sanctions in
BLOOMBERG
(Nov.
30,
2015,
11:00
PM),
Forex
Probes,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-01/seven-ubs-traders-may-be-firstto-face-sanctions-in-fx-probes [https://perma.cc/3A2N-6H9X].
10. See Rick Baert, Major Changes Are Coming Following FX Crackdown,
&
INVEST.
(Dec.
22,
2014),
PENSIONS
http://www.pionline.com/article/20141222/PRINT/312229983/major-changes-arecoming-following-fx-crackdown [https://perma.cc/MK8L-N58G].
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the financial world—in terms of asset values and rates of return, and
on the real world—in terms of production, trade and employment.”11
The benchmark rates are not only pivotal in the FX market, but the
“Dow Jones Industrial Average, S&P 500, FTSE 100, and others
equity indices all use the WM/Reuters benchmarks to compute the
value of stocks denominated in foreign currency.”12 Seventy-five
percent of all forex trading takes place in just five cities: London
(41%); New York (19%); Singapore (5.7%); Tokyo (5.6%); and
Hong Kong SAR (4.1%).13 Cities have long been centers for
commerce, trade, and ideas, and the FX manipulation scheme poses a
threat to the economies within these cities and the urban experiment
generally.
This Note aims to provide an approachable explanation of the
complex FX regulatory scheme and how the manipulation came
about, along with an analysis of the future of the market. Part I of
this Note outlines the history and structure of the FX market and
explains the way the manipulation scheme worked. Part II provides a
detailed look at the market’s regulatory scheme. Part III provides a
discussion of the arguments for and against additional regulation and
proposals that have been made. Lastly, Part IV proposes a solution
to the regulatory void present in the foreign exchange spot market: to
create a reporting requirement for the purpose of monitoring and
transparency and to impose more severe criminal sanctions.
I. MECHANICS OF THE FOREIGN CURRENCY MARKET AND
MANIPULATION SCHEME
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the foreign currency
exchange market, explains how the foreign exchange market
functions, explains its impact on other global markets, and details the
way the benchmark manipulation scheme worked.

11. Richard Myrus, From Bretton Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the
Exchange-Rate Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund and the
European Community, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2095, 2095 (1994) (“Orderly exchangerate management is crucial for nations seeking to maintain stable price levels and
sustained economic growth. Exchange rate volatility has a chilling effect on both free
trade and international investment because when exchange rates fluctuate
significantly, profits become uncertain and businesses must hedge exchange-rate
risks. This uncertainty diminishes the willingness of enterprises to trade with their
counterparts in other countries, ultimately resulting in reduced output and fewer jobs
in affected industries.”).
12. Verstein, supra note 3, at 236.
13. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL BANK SURVEY: FOREIGN
EXCHANGE TURNOVER IN APRIL 2013: PRELIMINARY GLOBAL RESULTS 8 (2013).
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A. Brief History of Currency Market
The stability of exchange rates14 is necessary to maintain economic
growth and financial prosperity, affecting nearly all areas in
international markets, including free trade and international
investment.15 To provide exchange-rate stability, major industrial
nations have proposed and engaged in a number of monetary systems
throughout the twentieth century.16 The most successful system17
emerged as a result of the Bretton Woods Accord in 1944.18 The
conference19 resulted in the creation of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the
formation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).20 The Bretton
Woods Accord required the international community to scrutinize
and control exchange-rate policies for the first time, rather than
countries reserving oversight as a matter of national sovereignty.21
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund
required that each nation would establish a par-value for its currency,
defined in terms of gold or United States currency, and that this rate
could only be changed or adjusted with the Fund’s authorization.22
Exchange rates were not to rise or fall more than one percent of the

14. An exchange rate is defined as: “[t]he price of one currency stated in terms of
another
currency.”
CFTC
Glossary,
CFTC,
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm
#E [https://perma.cc/3C72-VH3E] [hereinafter CFTC Glossary]. Exchange-rates
generally refer to benchmark exchange rates.
15. See Myrus, supra note 11, at 2095.
16. Id.
17. The European Community Exchange Rate Mechanism (“ERM”) has also
come close to maintaining exchange rate stability on a regional scale. Id.
18. Id.
19. Seven hundred representatives from forty-four nations convened at the
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, in July of 1944. See GREGORY J. MILLMAN, THE VANDALS’ CROWN: HOW
REBEL CURRENCY TRADERS OVERTHREW THE WORLD’S CENTRAL BANKS 55 (1995).
20. Myrus, supra note 11, at 2097. The agreement was a compromise between the
participating members’ goals to stabilize exchange rates. Id. These goals included the
expansion of world trade, international liquidity, and shielding domestic economies
from foreign disturbances. Id.
21. Myrus, supra note 11, at 2098. In the past, the power to control and maintain
monetary policy was controlled exclusively by the government. See Ashton S.
Phillips, Bank-Created Money, Monetary Sovereignty, and the Federal Deficit:
Toward A New Paradigm in the Government-Spending Debate, 36 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 221, 231 (2014) (“Indeed, the connection between sovereignty and monetary
power is so well established that the State’s sovereignty over its own currency is
traditionally recognized by public international law.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
22. Myrus, supra note 11, at 2099.
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established par-value, necessarily prohibiting the exchange rates from
floating against one another freely.23
The system was essentially a gold standard, and the U.S. dollar had
assumed the role of the key reserve currency by providing necessary
liquidity.24 Eventually, with inflationary pressures, the accounts held
in dollars began to exceed the U.S. monetary gold reserves, lowering
the value of the dollar and the fixed rate system became
unsustainable.25 The Bretton Woods Accord broke down by 1971
when the United States officially withdrew from the exchange rate
system.26 A Second Amendment to the Articles of the International
Still in place today, this
Monetary Fund passed in 1978.27
Amendment created a floating rate system,28 in which major
currencies are allowed to float against one another.29 According to
the Fund, “for want of a better label, the present system might
therefore be characterized as a discretionary and decentralized
system,”30 as opposed to the previous system directly controlled by
the IMF.
During the period of the Bretton Woods Agreement, the stability
of currency rates left little room for speculation.31 The currency
market was essentially a cash market, with currency exchanged only
for the commercial purpose of doing business internationally.32 A
bank customer would purchase foreign currency because of the actual

23. Id.
24. Id. at 2100.
25. Id. at 2101.
26. Id. at 2102.
A second, short-lived fixed-exchange rate system, the
Smithsonian Agreement was established by President Nixon in December of 1971. Id.
This system also broke down by March of 1973. Id. at 2103.
27. Id. at 2103.
28. A floating exchange rate is “[a] country’s exchange rate regime where its
currency is set by the foreign-exchange market through supply and demand for that
particular currency relative to other currencies. Thus, floating exchange rates change
freely and are determined by trading in the forex market. This is in contrast to a
‘fixed exchange rate’ regime.” Floating Exchange Rate, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/floatingexchangerate.asp
[https://perma.cc/7Y6R-8YY5].
29. MILLMAN, supra note 19, at 74; Armando T. Belly, The Derivative Market in

Foreign Currencies and the Commodity Exchange Act—The Status of Over-theCounter Futures Contracts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1455, 1463-64 (1997); see also Myrus,
supra note 11, at 2103.
30. Myrus, supra note 11, at 2103 (citing Int’l Monetary Fund, The Exchange Rate
System: Lessons of the Past and Options for the Future, Occasional Paper No. 30, at
40 (1984)).
31. Belly, supra note 29, at 1464.
32. See id.
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need to use it in a transaction.33 The FX market has since evolved
with the adoption of a floating rate system, with speculative
instruments now playing a substantial role.34
B.

Financial Instruments in Foreign Exchange Markets

Currency transactions take place in a number of different forms.
The distinction between the spot market and these financial
instruments is necessary to a complete understanding of the
regulatory scheme of this market. As discussed in Part II, financial
legislation and regulation identify and govern each instrument
individually. This Part defines spot transactions, forwards, futures,
swaps, and options.

1.

Spots

A spot trade is the most basic currency transaction, upon which all
financial instruments are built.35 A spot transaction is not a financial
instrument at all, but is “simply the exchange of one currency for
another currency, at the current or spot rate, or a ‘currency pair.’”36 It
is an agreement between two private parties, typically two banks, to
exchange a specified quantity of one currency for another for
immediate delivery, typically within two days.37 For example, Bank X
may contract to sell €100 million to Bank Y for U.S. dollars at an
exchange rate38 of 1.10 euro per dollar. Bank X would receive $110
million in exchange for its €100 million.

2.

Derivatives

Financial instruments derive their price from the exchange rate
determined in the spot market. Derivative products are financial
instruments whose value is determined by an underlying commodity
or financial product such as a stock or a bond.39 Those who buy and
sell currency derivatives have two goals in mind: to hedge the risk of

33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra Part I.B.1 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.B.2 and accompanying text.

RAJ BHALA, THE LAW OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 9 (1997).
John W. Labuszweski, Sanda Rio & David Gibbs, Currencies: Understanding
FX
Futures,
CME
GROUP
(Apr.
22,
2013),
https://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/understanding-fx-futures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LV5E-YSMX].
37. BHALA, supra note 35, at 9.
38. An exchange rate is “[t]he price of one currency in terms of another
currency.” CFTC Glossary, supra note 14.
39. BHALA, supra note 35, at 7.
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currency rate fluctuations and to profit off of accurate prediction of
future currency rates.40 Forwards,41 futures,42 swaps,43 and options44
are derivative instruments.
Derivatives are instruments of speculation.45 The parties are quite
literally purchasing and taking bets that certain events in the market
will or will not occur in the future.46 These instruments were, and still
are by some, considered to be a danger to the financial industry.
Warren Buffet, for example, has called derivatives “financial weapons
of mass destruction.”47 The word “derivatives” has also been referred
to as “the 11-letter, four letter word,” by Richard Syron, the

40. Id.
41. A forward contract is nearly identical to a spot transaction, but the parties
agree to defer the date of exchange to a later time. Labuszweski, Rio & Gibbs, supra
note 36, at 2-3. For example, a German company may know that it needs to buy an
American product a month from the time at which it makes a contract. The German
company may contract to buy the same $110 million for euros at the same rate. The
purpose behind forward contracts is to hedge—or mitigate—the risk of losing money
due to currency rate fluctuations between the time the forward contract is made and
the time the contract matures. Id. at 3-4.
42. Futures, like forwards, are contracts to buy or sell foreign currency at a fixed
rate in the future. BHALA, supra note 35, at 19. The most important distinction
between futures and forwards is that futures are standardized contracts lacking any
customization for any particular party, whereas forwards are geared for a particular
transaction. Id. at 20.
43. A swap is simultaneously a series of spot transactions and forward
transactions. “An FX swap may be thought of as a combination of two offsetting
currency transactions separated by time and constitute the largest segment of the FX
marketplace in terms of daily turnover.” Labuszweski, Rio & Gibbs, supra note 36, at
4. An FX swap is to be distinguished from a “currency swap,” which “entails an
element of an FX swap as well as an element of an interest rate swap.” Id.
44. Options are categorized as “call options,” or the right to buy currency at some
point in the future for a specified price, and “put options,” which is the right to sell
currency in the future. BHALA, supra note 35, at 29. These are generally referred to
as calls and puts. Id. at 31-34. What one is essentially purchasing in buying options is
simply the right, not the obligation, to sell or buy at a certain price. Id. at 29. The
option buyer, in effect, pays the seller to assume all of the risk of market fluctuations,
and in exchange the seller receives a premium for this service. MILLMAN, supra note
19, at 10. If the price of a currency increases, the right to buy it at a lower price (a call
option) will be valuable to a purchaser, and if the price to a currency decreases, the
right to sell it at a higher price (a put option) will be similarly valuable. Id.
45. See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis,
1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) (“Derivatives are literally bets—agreements
between parties that one will pay the other a sum of money that is determined by
whether or not a particular event occurs in the future.” (emphasis added)).
46. Id.
47. Brian M. McCall, Gambling on Our Financial Future: How the Federal

Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is a Safer Bet to Prevent Another
Financial Collapse, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1347 (2014).
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Chairman of the American Stock Exchange.48 The speculative nature
of derivatives, as opposed to the practical and commercial nature of
spot transactions, has lead to a distinction in the way these two types
of transactions are regulated.49
C.

How the Forex Market Works

With the exception of futures and options, the FX market is
geographically dispersed, decentralized, and takes place between
private parties, rather than through a central exchange.50 This over
the counter (OTC) system is divided into two tiers: the retail tier and
the wholesale tier.51 In the retail tier, most parties transact with banks
to exchange currencies.52 The banks are typically able to match these
retail deals on their own books. Any remaining balances are offset in
the wholesale market, where banks exchange currency in the
traditional interbank, or inter-dealer market.53 The central banks are
known as “market makers,”54 and “therefore play a critical role in

48. Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Controlling A Financial Jurassic Park
Obtaining Jurisdiction over Derivatives by Regulating Illegal Foreign Currency
Boiler Rooms, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 35, 35 (2007).
49. See infra Part II.
50. FIN. STABILITY BD., FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS FINAL REPORT 5
(2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140930.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX93HY8C] [hereinafter FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS].
51. Michael R. King, Carol Osler & Dagfinn Rime, Foreign Exchange Market
Structure, Players and Evolution 24 (Norges Bank, Working Paper, 2011),
http://www.unich.it/~vitale/Rime-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PRL-H6NY]. This clear
distinction has broken down with the creation of new trading platforms such as
multibank trading systems (“MBT”) and FX prime brokerage (“PB”), which allow
for customers to trade directly with FX dealers. Id. Banks have also created singlebank trading systems (SBT), which allow customers to enter orders to be fulfilled
within the bank itself. Id. at 25.
52. These parties include governments, hedge funds, corporations, institutional
investors and high net-worth individuals. Dagfinn Rime & Andreas Schrimpf, The
Anatomy of the Global FX Market Through the Lens of the 2013 Triennial Survey,
BIS
Q.
REV.
29
(2013),
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1312e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8E2P-EX2X].
53. Id. A dealer is “[a] financial institution that is entering into transactions on
both sides of the markets, seeking profits by taking risks in those markets and by
earning a spread; sometimes also referred to as a ‘sell-side.’” Id. at 43.
54. “Market makers ‘make’ or set both the bid and the ask prices on their systems
and display them publicly on their quote screens. Grace Cheng, Market Makers vs.
Electronic
Communications
Networks,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/06/ecnmarketmaker.asp#ixzz3vBMpyVPF
[https://perma.cc/4LJV-7XZC]. They stand prepared to make transactions at these
prices with their customers, who range from banks to retail forex traders. Id. In
doing this, market makers provide some liquidity to the market.” Id.
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ensuring the continued functioning of the market,”55 by virtue of both
buying and selling currencies.56
Electronic platforms facilitate both the interbank and retail
markets. The two most used platforms are the Thomas Reuters
Dealing (Reuters) and the Electronic Broking Service (EBS).57 The
lower transaction costs of electronic trading have greatly reduced the
bid-ask spread58 between the retail market and the interbank market,
reducing the profit to banks at the retail level.59 This decrease in
profit and the need to invest in technology to access electronic
platforms have reduced the number of banks at the highest level of
the FX market.60
Further, although these electronic platforms facilitate anonymous
trading, banks must identify and give prior authorization to deal with
each other bank, essentially creating “an invitation only market.”61
The minimum trade amount for the interbank market is typically $5
million and is too large an amount for smaller banks to be able to
participate.62 As a result, four banks make up 50% of the market.63

55. Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 3:15-cr79(SRU) (D. Conn. May 20, 2015). This decentralized market is open for trading
twenty-four hours a day. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 5.
The market opens at 5:00 a.m. in Sydney every Monday morning and closes at 5:00
p.m. in New York every Friday. Id.
56. Around the year 2000, retail-oriented platforms began to bundle many small
trades together and then sell them to the interbank market. Rime & Schrimpf, supra
note 52, at 39. These “retail aggregators” have received better prices than they would
have selling individually. Id.
57. King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 22.
58. The bid-ask spread is the difference between the price a bank is willing to pay
(the bid price) and the price a bank is willing to sell (the ask or offer price) foreign
currency. CFTC Glossary, supra note 14. The profit banks earn is the difference
between the bid-ask spread, which compensates them for the risk they take that the
exchange rate will drop before they find another buyer.
59. King, Osler & Rime supra note 51, at 29.
60. Id.
61. Verstein, supra note 3, at 238.
62. See id. €1 million is the minimum trade size on the interdealer market; €5
million is the upper range for most interdealer trades; and €25 million is the level at
which customer trades are typically handled with human intervention. Geir Høidal
Bjønnes, Neophytos Kathitziotis & Carol Osler, The Cost of FX Liquidity: Empirical
Tests of Competing Theories 8 (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.ifw-kiel.de/konfer/staffseminar/paper/2014/Bjonnes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VY44-QX8R]
(unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Brandeis Univ.).
63. Vaughan, Finch & Choudhury, supra note 1. These four banks are: Deutsche
Bank AG; Citigroup Inc.; Barclays Plc.; and UBS AG. Id.
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In 2013, 98% of the U.S. spot market consisted of trades by ten
firms.64 The largest five firms accounted for 80% of the spot market.65
D. Benchmarks
A benchmark is “a standard against which foreign exchange rates
may be measured.”66 Essentially, a benchmark is a standardized spot
exchange rate of two currencies.67 Thousands of transactions occur in
the FX market every day with parties exchanging currencies at
different rates. A benchmark gives buyers an idea of what the
exchange rate between two currencies might be for any given day by
providing a standard rate. There are two important benchmark rates
for the FX market: the World Markets/Reuters fix (WM/Reuters) and
the European Central Bank fix (ECB).
The WM/Reuters fix was created in 199468 for the purpose of
providing “a clear single independent reference rate for the foreign
exchange market.”69 The WM/Reuters is, by and large, the prominent
FX benchmark.70 In addition to the FX market, WM/Reuters is also
used as a key input in multi-currency equity, bond, and credit
indices.71 It is hardwired directly into other benchmarks such as the
DOW Jones and S&P 500.72 The Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) notes that the “WM/R[euters] Rates are the
most widely referenced FX benchmark rates in the United States and
globally.”73 As a result, the WM/Reuters fix has a direct and
consequential effect on financial markets, beyond currency
exchanges, around the world.

64. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATE
DERIVATIVES MARKETS: TURNOVER IN THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 2013, at 6 (2013),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/markets/pdf/2013triennialreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JW8-QEZF].
65. Id.
66. THE WM COMPANY, WM/REUTERS SPOT & FORWARD RATES METHODOLOGY
GUIDE 17 (2012), http://www.wmcompany.com/pdfs/WMReutersMethodology.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9FRP-EBYH].
67. BHALA, supra note 35, at 9.
68. “The WM/Reuters service is a joint venture between The WM Company and
Thomson
Reuters.”
History,
WM
COMPANY,
http://www.wmcompany.com/wmr/AboutUs/History/ [https://perma.cc/C6JU-8CSX].
69. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 7.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1.
72. Verstein, supra note 3, at 236.
73. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-04, 2014 WL 6068387, at *2
(Nov. 11, 2014).
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WM/Reuters calculates spot fix rates, forward rates, and nondeliverable forward rates, providing spot fix rates for 160 currencies.74
WM/Reuters calculates these rates with two different methods, 21
trade currencies and 139 non-trade currencies.75 Also known as the
4pm London Fix, WM/Reuters records the exchanges of single trades
during the thirty seconds before and the thirty seconds after 4:00pm
London time using transactional and quote data from the Thomson
Reuters Matching and EBS trading platforms.76 The WM/Reuters
benchmark is the average rate of exchange during this one-minute
period.77
The ECB provides foreign exchange rates for the euro against
thirty-two different currencies on a daily basis.78 The ECB rates are
based upon trade information within and outside the European
System of Central Banks at 2:15pm Central European Time.79 A
number of institutions, particularly non-financial corporations, use
this benchmark. The ECB rates use has increased as a result of the
FX benchmark investigations.80
Traders are well aware of the calculation of these benchmarks and
structure their trading around them. To prevent affecting the
benchmark, they may trade on electronic platforms other than the
Reuters or ESB or they may buy and sell over the telephone.81 A
trader can push the benchmark higher or lower by timing transactions
around the 4 PM and 2:15 PM periods used for the benchmarks. For

74. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 8.
75. Id. This note will discuss the calculation method for trade currencies; for an
explanation of the calculation for non-trade currencies, see id. at 10.
76. Id. at 8. The FX market continues to trade through and after the main 4:00
p.m. London fixing window, even though the 4:00 p.m. rate is often referred to as a
‘closing’ rate. Id. at 5, 15.
77. This rate has been extended to five minutes. See infra note 298 and
accompanying text.
78. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 11.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See In re Citibank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-03, 2014 WL 6068386, at *4 (Nov. 11,
2014) (explaining banks strategically offset some position outside of the polled
window and venue); BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING IN
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 9 (2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/mktc05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FK2Q-4R2H?type=pdf] (“They can evade detection . . . by
executing large flows in less transparent venues, including reverting to transacting
bilaterally over the telephone.”). This is evidenced by the decrease in concentration
of interdealer transactions conducted on Reuters and ESB (those platforms that
determine the exchange rate benchmark) from 22% in 2010 to 16% in 2013 and the
noticeable increase in turnover rates during the time before and after the WMR
London 4pm fix. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 1.
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example, if a trader wanted the Euro/Dollar exchange rate to go from
1.0770 to 1.0785, he would make sure to be trading at or above a rate
of 1.0785 in significant quantities during the one minute fix period.
E.

Incentive Structure

A bank typically acts as a dealer, buying and selling currency to its
customers throughout the day. In these transactions, banks guarantee
their customers the benchmark rate that day before the fix and thus
agree to contract with customers at an unknown price to be
determined during the fix calculation window.82 This “trading ahead”
means that the banks take on the risk that the benchmark rate will
move against them and creates an incentive to move the rates in their
favor.83 It was this structure that incentivized FX dealers to try to
manipulate the benchmark rate and to make a profit by collusion and
sharing confidential client information.84 The goal was to push the
benchmark rate up or down, depending on the customer orders they
had as a collective group, in order to create the maximum profit for
the traders.85
F.

How the Manipulation Scheme Worked

As early as 2006, regulators were alerted to trouble with the
London fix when bankers hinted that “players that had no particular
interest in that fix” were moving prices.86 Seven years later, in June
2013, Bloomberg published an article suggesting that the foreign
currency rates were rigged.87 Over two years of investigation by
82. FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 2.
83. See Claer Barrett & John Aglionby, Traders’ Forex Chatroom Banter
Exposed,
FIN.
TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2014,
2:09
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/47c32ec4-6a34-11e4-8fca-00144feabdc0.html#slide0
[https://perma.cc/4BY4-F5WD].
84. See Chiara Albanese, Forex Scandal Drives Shift to Algo Trading, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 28, 2015, 8:51 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/forex-scandal-drives-shiftto-algo-trading-1443444666?alg=y
[https://perma.cc/U92G-2285]
[hereinafter
Albanese, Forex Scandal Drives Shift to Algo Trading].
85. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 2.
86. Marion Dakers, How the Forex Trading Scandal Came to Light, TELEGRAPH
(Nov.
13,
2014,
6:47
AM)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11227006/Howthe-forex-trading-scandal-came-to-light.html [https://perma.cc/53M6-U63L]; James
Quinn & John Ficenec, The Lunch Meetings at the Heart of the Bank of England
TELEGRAPH
(Nov.
12,
2014,
11:30
AM),
Forex
Inquiry,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/bank-of-england/10685543/The-lunch-meetingsat-the-heart-of-the-Bank-of-England-forex-inquiry.html
[https://perma.cc/X2YW2T3K].
87. See Vaughan, Finch & Choudhury, supra note 1.
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dozens of regulatory and government agencies around the world
revealed a long and intricate scheme in which traders for the world’s
biggest international banks manipulated the foreign currency
exchange benchmark for their own profit.88 Traders used private
electronic chat rooms with names such as “the players,” “the three
musketeers,”89 “The Cartel,” “The Mafia,” and “The Bandits’ Club”90
to communicate and attempt to manipulate the benchmark by trading
disproportionately during the fix period to profit from their clients’
positions.91 Traders would have multiple chat rooms open at once,
each one focusing on a particular currency pair.92 The conversations
were often in slang, used code words, and intentionally used poor
grammar and spelling to evade systematic checks.93
Membership in the chat rooms was exclusive and by invitation
only.94 For example, consider the following conversation between
bankers considering allowing a new member into the chat room:
UBS Trader: 7:49:55 are we ok with keeping this as is .. ie the info
lvls & risk sharing?
Citibank Trader: 7:50:27 well...
UBS Trader: 7:50:30 that is the qu[estion]
Citibank Trader: 7:50:32 you know him best obv...
7:50:39 if you think we need to adjust it
7:50:43 then he shouldn’t be[] in chat
JPMC Trader: 7:50:54 yeah that is key
7:51:00 simple question [UBS trader]
7:51:08 I trust you implicitly [UBS trader]
7:51:13 and your judgement
7:51:16 you know him

88. Dakers, supra note 86.
89. Chad Bray, Jenny Anderson & Ben Protess, Big Banks Are Fined $4.25
Billion in Inquiry Into Currency-Rigging, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2014,
2:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/british-and-u-s-regulators-finebig-banks-3-16-billion-in-foreign-exchange-scandal/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/CA2LXQSZ].
90. Elvis Picardo, How the Forex “Fix” May Be Rigged, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 2,
2014),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/031714/how-forex-fix-may-berigged.asp [https://perma.cc/JN2T-D55R].
91. Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas, DEP’T JUSTICE (May
20, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guiltypleas [https://perma.cc/W4XX-V35R] [hereinafter Five Major Banks Agree to
Parent-Level Guilty Pleas].
92. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068387, at *4 (Nov. 11, 2014).
93. Id. at *5.
94. Id. at *4.
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7:51:21 will he tell rest of desk stuff
7:51:26 or god forbin his nyk...
Citibank Trader: 7:51:46 yes
7:51:51 that’s really imp[ortant] q[uestion]
7:52:01 dont want other numpty’s in mkt to know
7:52:17 but not only that
7:52:21 is he gonna protect us
7:52:33 like we protect each other against our own
branches
7:52:46 ie if you guys are rhs95.. and my nyk is
lhs..ill say my nyk lhs in few
UBS Trader: 7:53:52 what concerns me is that i know he’ll never
tell us when at risk...96
The traders decided to let the fourth trader from Barclays into the
chat room on a “1 month trial” basis, before which he was told “mess
this up and sleep with one eye open.”97
The traders used a number of strategies. According to the CFTC
Order filing and settling charges against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(JPMC) filed on November 11, 2014:
At times, in certain chat rooms, FX traders at JPMC and
other banks disclosed confidential customer order
information and trading positions, altered trading
positions to accommodate the interests of the collective
group, and agreed on trading strategies as part of an
effort by the group to attempt to manipulate certain FX
benchmark rates, in some cases downward and in some
cases upward.98
Traders would exchange information about their respective banks’
net position and attempt to coordinate their trades. One method the
traders used was a practice known as “netting off.”99 If one trader
had a net position in the opposite direction as the other traders in the

95. Traders used “right-hand side” (rhs) and “left-hand side” (lhs) to refer to the
currency that they were selling. For example, a trader’s position looking to sell
EUR/USD would be “lhs.” Id.
96. Id.; see also In re Citibank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068386, at *5 (Nov. 11, 2014); In
re UBS AG, CFTC No. 15-06, 2014 WL 6068389, at *5 (Nov. 11, 2014).
97. Kevin McCoy & Kevin Johnson, 5 Banks Guilty of Rate–rigging, Pay More
than
$5B,
USA
TODAY
(May
20,
2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/05/20/billions-in-bank-fxsettlements/27638443/ [https://perma.cc/93HC-RSJW].
98. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068387, at *2.
99. Id. at *5.
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group before the fix period, he would try to sell those positions with
traders outside of the chat room in order to maintain the groups’
overall position in the same direction.100
The Southern District of New York (SDNY) explains other specific
strategies traders allegedly used in more detail in an order denying in
part and granting in part a motion to dismiss a private action against
the banks:
[1] “Front running” or “trading ahead”—Defendants
traded their own proprietary positions before executing
their customers’ large market-moving trades so that
Defendants could take positions to their benefit and “to
the detriment of the customer;”101 [2] “Banging the
close”—Because the calculation of the Fix does not
weight the trades by amount traded and takes into
account only the number of trades in any currency pair,
traders conspired to impact the Fix by engaging in more
trades. To this end, traders broke up larger orders into
smaller amounts and concentrated the trades in the
minutes before and after the Fixing Window to affect
the Fix; [and 3] “Painting the screen”—Defendants’
traders placed fake orders with other Defendants to
create the illusion of trading activity in a given direction
to move rates prior to the Fixing Window. These trades
were not actually executed.102
In contrast to “banging the close,” another widely reported
strategy to manipulate the benchmark was “building ammo” where
one trader would accumulate a large quantity in a currency and then
sell the “ammo” right before or during the fix period in an effort to
move the benchmark.103 For example:
On January 6, 2012, one Barclays trader, who was also
a Head of the FX Spot desk in London, attempted to
manipulate the ECB fix by unloading EUR 500

100. Id.
101. Front-running is technically legal in the FX market. See infra Part III.B.
102. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581,
587-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
103. Lianna Brinded, Barclays FX Fixing Traders Colluded in Chatrooms and Said
‘We All Die Together’, BUS. INSIDER UK (May 20, 2015, 3:53 PM),
http://uk.businessinsider.com/barclays-fx-traders-chatroom-transcripts-of-currencymarket-collusion-2015-5?IR=T [https://perma.cc/V2V7-UU9H]; Press Release, N.Y.
Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Announces Barclays to Pay $2.4 Billion, Terminate
Employees for Conspiring to Manipulate Spot FX Trading Market (May 20, 2015),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1505201.htm [https://perma.cc/NV5E-FZBP].

2016]FILLING THE REGULATORY VOID IN THE FX 155
million right at the fix time, stating in the Cartel chat
room “i saved 500 for last second” and in another chat
room “i had 500 to jam it.”104
In another example the traders had the following exchange:
Bank W Trader: 3:46:53 i’d prefer we join forces
Bank Y Trader: 3:46:56 perfick
3:46:59 lets do this...
3:47:11 lets double team them
Bank W Trader: 3:47:12 YESssssssssssss105
Immediately after the fixing window, the traders congratulated
themselves:
Bank W Trader: 4:03:25 sml rumour we haven’t lost it
Bank Y Trader: 4:03:45 we
4:03:46 do
4:03:48 dollarrr106
The conversations make clear that the traders knew what they were
doing was illegal. When one HSBC trader was left out of a collusion
he scolded another trader, “[you] are uselees[sic] . . . how can I make
free money with no ****ing heads up.”107 In 2010, a Barclays
employee was quoted as saying in one chat: “markup is making sure
you make the right decision on price . . . .which is [what’s] the worst
price [I] can put on this where the customers decision to trade with
me or give me future business doesn’t change . . . .if you aint cheating,
you aint trying.”108
This statement reveals the state of trading in forex during the years
of collusion. The traders decided on what the forex benchmarks
would be based upon their profit margin rather than the actual
demands of the market. For years, traders at the largest firms in the
world engaged in these conversations every day with the purpose of
manipulating the market to make as much money off of their
customer’s orders as they could.

104. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., supra note 103.
105. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068387, at *6 (Nov. 11, 2014).
106. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, EXAMPLES OF MISCONDUCT IN
PRIVATE
CHATROOMS
(2014),
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/hsbcmisconduct111
114.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F79-PCCU].
107. Dakers, supra note 86.
108. Kirstin Ridley, In FX Rigging: “If You Ain’t Cheating, You Ain’t Trying”,
REUTERS (May 20, 2015, 1:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/banks-forexsettlement-traders-idUSL5N0YB3Q820150520 [https://perma.cc/S6LB-ESX9].
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II. CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME OF THE FX MARKET
The foreign currency markets have been the subject of numerous
crimes, resulting in a loss of $460 million to nearly 26,000 people in
the United States between 2001 and 2007.109 Further, as a result of
their actions before and after the financial crisis, banks have been
subject to $100 billion in United States legal fines alone since the
crisis hit.110 Despite this, the spot market is still largely unregulated.111
For the vast majority of its history the foreign currency market has
not come under the authority of any legislative act. In recent years,
other financial instruments such as swaps, options, futures, and
derivatives have all come under legislation.112 The spot market,
however, has been explicitly exempted from each act and remains
unregulated in the United States,113 the UK,114 and Europe,115 leaving a
regulatory void in this market.
This lack of regulation has led to a scarcity in market data, as there
is no single reporting agency or corporation for the market as a
whole. Unlike stocks and commodities, which have highly regulated
and carefully watched markets, “on any given day no one knows how

109. Aitken, supra note 4.
110. Michael Flaherty, Banks Should Defer Bonuses 10 Years, Tap Them for
REUTERS
(Oct.
20,
2014,
6:07
PM),
Fines:
Fed
Official,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-dudley-idUSKCN0I92C520141020
[https://perma.cc/83D9-GSDE].
111. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 5 (“There is not a
single market place, and much of the market is not subject to formal
regulation . . . .”); King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 8 (“The vast majority of FX
trading is essentially unregulated, in striking contrast to the extensive regulations in
most equity and bond markets.”).
112. See generally NAT’L FUTURES ASSOC., FOREX TRANSACTIONS: A
REGULATORY GUIDE (2016) http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa-compliance/publicationlibrary/forex-regulatory-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2RR-9ARA] (explaining that
the CFTC has regulatory jurisdiction over currency futures and options); Fact Sheet:
Final Determination on Foreign Exchange Swaps and Forwards, U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY,
(Nov.
16,
2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1773.aspx [https://perma.cc/AC3Z-T4MC] [hereinafter Fact Sheet:
Final Determination] (explaining that “FX swaps and forwards [are] subject to the
Dodd-Frank Act’s new requirement to report trades to repositories and rigorous
business conduct standards”).
113. See Aitken, supra note 4.
114. See id. (“One difficulty for the UK financial regulator is that spot forex
contracts are not in themselves qualifying investments under The Financial Services
and Markets Act and therefore the market abuse regime under that Act and the
FCA’s Code of Market Conduct does not apply.”).
115. See 10 Things You Should Know – Regulation in the FX Markets, NORTON
ROSE
FULBRIGHT
(June
2014),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/117779/10-things-youshould-know-regulation-in-the-fx-markets [https://perma.cc/WNX4-PUME].
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much was traded in FX markets – not the regulators, not the
monetary authorities, not even the major FX dealers.”116 When asked
why it took regulators so long to find out about the manipulation, the
CEO of the Financial Conduct Authority, a financial regulatory body
in the UK answered, “[these] are not regulated markets. So, the spot
FX market is not a regulated market. Where it’s not a regulated
market, we don’t get regular reports. . . . We don’t have things we can
monitor. . . .”117 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
compiles the only source of aggregate data for the FX market every
three years in the Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign
Exchange Market Activity in an effort by central banks around the
world every third April.118
Despite this void, it was previously thought that the immense size
of the market and its liquidity119 served to prevent market
manipulation from occurring. As stated in 2012: “Fortunately, the FX
market is sufficiently liquid that significant manipulation by any single
actor is all but impossible during active trading hours for the major
currencies.”120 The regulatory void, evidently, was not thought to
have been problematic whatsoever but that it was merely a byproduct of the immense size of the FX market.
This Part provides a discussion of the history of foreign exchange
regulation and outlines the numerous laws Congress passed and
regulations agencies promulgated, ultimately showing that while all
foreign exchange instruments have come under the jurisdiction of
some regulation, spot transactions are still largely unregulated. Each
subpart discusses the specific sanctions brought in relation to this
scheme by each regulatory body. Part II.D provides an overview of
international foreign exchange regulation, concluding the same. Part
II.F then discusses the remaining repercussions of the manipulation
scheme.

116. King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 8.
117. Press Conference, in Press Release, Fin. Conduct Authority, FCA Fines Five
Banks £1.1 Billion for FX Failings and Announces Industry-wide Remediation
Programme, (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-five-banks-for-fxfailings [https://perma.cc/SK3G-N9W2] [hereinafter FCA Press Conference].
118. See King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 8.
119. A liquid market is one “in which selling and buying can be accomplished with
minimal effect on price.” CFTC Glossary, supra note 14.
120. King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 8.
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A. Commodities Futures Trading Commission

1.

Commodities Exchange Act

The first piece of legislation to purport to regulate the foreign
currency market was the Commodities Exchange Act.121 The
Commodities Exchange Act was rooted in concerns over speculation
in wheat prices.122 The volatility of grain prices caused the forward
grain market to develop into one of speculation, in which investors
would trade futures and derivative contracts, the profits and losses of
which depended upon the rise and fall of grain prices.123 Congress
enacted the Futures Trading Act in 1921 to regulate excessive
speculation.124 This Act has developed into the modern Commodities
Exchange Act (“CEA”).125 Congress established the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission as an independent federal regulatory
agency by an amendment to the Act in 1974.126 The CEA is the
principal means by which all commodity future transactions in the
United States are regulated.127
Spots and forward transactions are exempted from regulation
under the CEA. The Act gives the CFTC the authority to regulate
“contracts for sale of a commodity for future delivery,” typically
called “commodity futures contracts.”128 While the CEA does not
provide a precise definition for a sale “for future delivery” the Act
does explicitly state that “[t]he term ‘“future delivery’” does not
include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or

121. See Thomas A. Tormey, A Derivatives Dilemma: The Treasury Amendment
Controversy and the Regulatory Status of Foreign Currency Options, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2313, 2327-28 (1997).
122. William L. Stein, The Exchange–Trading Requirement of the Commodity
Exchange Act, 41 VAND. L. REV. 473, 477 & n.23 (1988).
123. Belly, supra note 29, at 1465.
124. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 970 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Pub. L.
No. 67–66, 42 Stat. 187); Stein, supra note 122, at 473, 477 & n.23 (collecting relevant
legislative history)).
125. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (2014). One year after its enactment, the Supreme Court
declared the Act unconstitutional as an improper exercise of Congress’s taxing
power. Belly, supra note 29, at 1474. In response, Congress passed the Grain Futures
Act of 1922, which was essentially identical to the Futures Trading Act, with the
important exception that it was passed under the powers of the Commerce Clause.
Id. The Grain Futures Act made it a misdemeanor to enter into a grain futures
contract in any way except on a designated market. Id. The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Act 1923. Id.
126. See Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974). Congress renamed the Act in
1936. See Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
127. Stein, supra note 122, at 478.
128. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2014).
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delivery.”129 Spot transactions were excluded as sales for a cash
commodity, not for future delivery, and forwards were excluded as a
sale “for deferred shipment or delivery.”130
This regulatory
distinction was made because it was thought that spot transactions,
which deal with the actual commodity (currency), do not present the
same incentive for manipulation as speculative instruments do.131
This subtle but immensely consequential distinction has brought
about much litigation regarding what transactions are defined as
futures, and therefore fall within the Act, and which transactions are
defined as spots132 and forwards and are exempt from regulation.133

2.

Treasury Amendment

While the definition of “future delivery” exempted spot and
forward foreign currency transactions, the remaining foreign currency
instruments were exempted through the Treasury Amendment.134
The Amendment states: “Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to
govern or in any way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency
[or a variety of financial instruments] unless such transactions involve
the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade.”135
The legislative history cites concerns that transactions in foreign
currency, “carried out through an informal network of banks and
tellers” are “more properly supervised by the bank regulatory
agencies.”136 The legislative history states that because of this
alternative way to regulate banking activity, regulation of the FX
market under the CEA was unnecessary.

129. Id. § 1a(27).
130. See Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 970-71 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing
Pub. L. No. 67–66, 42 Stat. 187); CFTC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp. 1177
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986).
131. See Tauber, 8 F.3d at 970-71.
132. CFTC v. Calvary Currencies LLC, 437 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460 (D. Md. 2006).
133. See Elizabeth D. Lauzon, What Are “Contracts of Sale of a Commodity for

Future Delivery” Within Meaning of Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et
seq.), 182 A.L.R. Fed. 559 (2002).
134. 7 U.S.C. § 2(c) (2014). As Congress considered the passage of the CEA,
Department of the Treasury sent a letter expressing concern about the impositions
the new act would have on interbank currency market, proposed that Congress create
an exemption for transactions and leave banking regulation to the Comptroller of
Currency and Federal Reserve. Belly, supra note 29, at 1482. The Act incorporated
language nearly identical to that proposed by the Department of Treasury in what is
known as the Treasury Amendment. Id.
135. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2014).
136. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 23 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843,
5863, 5887.
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The scope of the CFTC was changed in the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act of 2000.137 The CFMA explicitly removed the
CFTC’s power to regulate OTC derivatives trade among
“sophisticated parties,” in addition to extending the CFTC’s power to
regulating OTC futures transactions with a retail customer on one
side.138 The CFMA’s deregulation has had such profound effects that
it has been credited with being the “most direct and significant cause”
of the financial crisis of 2008.139

3.

Dodd-Frank Act

The Dodd-Frank Act,140 passed in light of the 2008 financial crisis
“put in place a comprehensive set of reforms to help build stronger,
safer, and more efficient financial markets.”141 The Act brought
nearly all foreign exchange instruments under the jurisdiction of the
CFTC or the SEC. The Act requires all swaps to be traded on a
central exchange and secured by a clearinghouse and regulated by the
CFTC or the SEC. The Act provided the U.S. Department of
Treasury (Treasury Department) with authority to determine if
foreign exchange transactions may be exempt from these
requirements.142 On November 16, 2012, the Treasury Department
issued a final ruling providing that foreign exchange transactions are
exempt from the definition of a “swap” under the CEA,143 and thus
are excluded from some regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act.

137. See Commodities Future Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 4541, 106th Cong.
(2000).
138. Regulation of Forex in the Wake of Dodd-Frank. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
(Oct. 14, 2011), https://www.foley.com/regulation-of-forex-in-the-wake-of-doddfrank-10-14-2011/ [https://perma.cc/8NZ4-VQLE].
139. Stout, supra note 45 (“The crisis was caused, first and foremost, by changes in
the law. In particular, the crisis was the direct, foreseeable, and in fact
foreseen . . . consequence of the CFMA’s sudden and wholesale removal of centuriesold legal constraints on speculative trading in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.”
(emphasis added)).
140. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, Tit.VII, 124 Stat 1376
(2010).
141. Fact Sheet: Final Determination, supra note 112.
142. Id.
143. See Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange
Forwards under the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69694, 69694 (Nov. 16,
2012); Silla Brush, U.S. Treasury Exempts Foreign Exchange Swaps from DoddBLOOMBERG
BUS.
(Nov.
16,
2012,
9:26
PM)
Frank,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-11-16/u-s-treasury-exempts-foreignexchange-swaps-from-dodd-frank [https://perma.cc/5YRN-ZCS8].
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Deutsche Bank AG, Bank of New York Mellon Corp., UBS AG,
and other banks supported the determination, while the Treasury
Department met resistance by regulators and Democratic
lawmakers.144 The Treasury Department stated: “Unlike other
derivatives, FX swaps and forwards already trade in a highlytransparent, liquid and efficient market.”145
Even with this
determination, FX swaps and forwards “remain subject to the DoddFrank Act’s new requirement to report trades to repositories and
rigorous business conduct standards.”146 Thus, FX instruments are
now subject to limited regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act.
The CFTC and SEC issued a final joint rule interpreting the DoddFrank Act on August 12, 2013 to address concerns that spot
transactions may be considered an exchange “on a specific date in the
future” and would thus qualify as a foreign exchange forward under
the Act.147 The rule states: “The CEA generally does not confer
regulatory jurisdiction on the CFTC with respect to spot
transactions.”148 The Commissions then provide clarification that “a
bona fide foreign exchange spot transaction, i.e., a foreign exchange
transaction that is settled on the customary timeline of the relevant
spot market, is not within the definition of the term “swap,” and thus
not subject to regulation.149 The customary timeline “of a two-day
settlement for spot foreign currency transactions has been recognized
by the CFTC and the courts.”150 However, depending on “relevant
facts and circumstances” that may affect that timeline, “the
Commissions will consider a foreign exchange transaction that is
entered into solely to effect the purchase or sale of a foreign security
to be a bona fide spot transaction where certain conditions are
met.”151 The rule thus clarified that the CFTC and the SEC do not
intend to impose any regulatory power upon traditional spot
transactions.

144. Brush, supra note 143.
145. Fact Sheet: Final Determination, supra note 112.
146. Id.
147. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “SecurityBased Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement
Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48207, 48257 (Aug. 13, 2012).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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Manipulation Laws

Despite legislative failure to grant jurisdictional authority over spot
transactions to the CFTC, the Commission maintains some authority
over these transactions through anti-manipulation provisions of the
Act, § 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). The CEA provides that it shall be
a felony for “[a]ny person to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the
price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery
on or subject to the rules of any registered entity.”152 The CEA also
provides that notwithstanding its explicit exclusion of foreign
currency, such transactions are subject to the anti-manipulation
provisions.153
Historically, the CFTC has been largely unsuccessful in prosecuting
manipulation claims. “[T]he CFTC has only won one case in thirtyseven years.”154 The CFTC has, however settled a number of claims
and has successfully maintained actions by demonstrating such
authority.155
The Dodd-Frank Act provides the CFTC with
significantly expanded authority over manipulative conduct,156 and by
such authority, the CFTC has promulgated new regulations.157 The
Dodd-Frank Act added anti-manipulation language mirroring that of

152. 7 U.S.C. § 13 (2014).
153. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C) (2006) (“Notwithstanding subclauses (II) and (III)
of subparagraph (B)(ii), agreements, contracts, or transactions described in
subparagraph (B) shall be subject to sections 4b, 4c(b), 6(c) and 6(d) (to the extent
that sections 6(c) and 6(d) prohibit manipulation of the market price of any
commodity, in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of
any market), 6c, 6d, and 8(a) if they are entered into by a futures commission
merchant or an affiliate of a futures commission merchant that is not also an entity
described in subparagraph (B)(ii) of this paragraph.”).
154. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Revolution

in Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and
Empirical Analyses, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 357, 359 (2013).
155. See, e.g., CFTC v. Atha, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (finding “the
manipulation of the price of any commodity is prohibited”); CFTC v. Johnson, 408 F.
Supp. 2d 259 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (finding manipulation under a fraud-based theory
within the jurisdiction of the CFTC); CFTC v. Enron Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28794 (D. Tex. 2004) (CFTC alleged violation of Section 9(a)(2) for manipulation of
Henry Hub natural gas next-day spot market).
156. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 15 (2014). The authority for the CFTC’s new antimanipulation regulations is section 753 of Dodd-Frank, which amends section 6(c) of
the Commodity Exchange Act. See id.
157. Abrantes-Metz, Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 154, at 360 (citing
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulation and
Deceptive Devices, Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41398 (July 14,
2011)).
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the well-known securities fraud SEC Rule 10b-5158 and thus adopted
the expansive case law interpreting the statute, although the CFTC
does not intend to be bound by those precedents.159 The Act also
extended CFTC authority to reckless manipulative conduct.160
The CEA has long prohibited manipulation, proven by four
elements: (1) a manipulative act or omission; (2) intent; (3) causation;
and (4) artificial price.161 Of these, the element of price artificiality
has been called the sine qua non of manipulation.162 An artificial
price is one that does not “reflect basic forces of supply and demand,”
and creates “conditions which prevent the futures market from
performing its basic economic function and hence [diminishes] its
utility to those members of the trade and general public who rely on
its basic purposes.”163 Meanwhile, attempted manipulation requires
the showing of only two elements: intent and an overt act in
furtherance of that intent, providing a lower bar for prosecution of
such conduct. Therefore, in the FX manipulation scheme, as in any
scheme, the burden to prove attempted manipulation is lower than
the burden to prove the four elements of manipulation itself.

5.

Charges Brought by CFTC in FX Manipulation

On November 11, 2014, the CFTC issued Orders against five
banks: Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, The Royal Bank of
Scotland (RBS), and UBS AG, filing and settling charges of
attempted manipulation and aiding and abetting attempts to
manipulate the FX benchmark, collectively resulting in $1.4 billion in

158. Rule 10b-5 provides that it shall be unlawful “for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
159. Mark D. Young, “Summary of New CFTC Market Manipulation Rules”,
SKADDEN (Nov. 30, 2010), https://www.skadden.com/insights/summary-new-cftcmarket-manipulation-rules [https://perma.cc/XS42-4WK2].
160. Abrantes-Metz, Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 154, at 359.
161. Id. at 369-70.
162. Id. at 370.
163. Id. at 370 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1158 (8th Cir. 1971)).
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fines.164 On May 20, 2015, the CFTC filed a separate Order filing and
settling the same charges against Barclays.165
Although the CEA gives the CFTC authority over spot
transactions in Section 2(c)(2)(C), the Order clearly incorporates a
nexus to the derivatives market in stating:
FX benchmark rates, including the WM/R Rates, are
used to price a variety of transactions including foreign
exchange swaps, cross-currency swaps, spot transactions,
forwards, options, futures and other financial derivative
instruments . . . . Accordingly, the integrity of the WM/R
Rates and other FX benchmark rates is critical to the
integrity of the markets in the United States and around
the world.166
The Orders charge that the banks lacked internal controls, failed to
perceive the risks associated with participation in the FX benchmark
rates, failed to adequately supervise their traders, and failed to
monitor electronic chat rooms.167 The Orders also find the banks
engaged in attempted manipulation, finding the two necessary
elements of intent to affect the market price and an overt act.168 With
the transcripts of the chat room discussions, the CFTC found that the
traders “acted . . . with the purpose or conscious object of causing or
effecting a price or price trend in the market that did not reflect
legitimate forces of supply and demand.”169 The settlement of
attempted manipulation did not require the CFTC to show that there
would actually be an effect on the FX benchmark or the price of the
transactions, as would have been necessary for a showing of market
manipulation.170 The banks were also found liable for the acts of its
traders through agency liability, and for aiding and abetting the
attempted manipulation of other banks.171

164. CFTC Orders Five Banks to Pay over $1.4 Billion in Penalties for Attempted
Manipulation of Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates, CFTC (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7056-14
[https://perma.cc/ZF55PPNH] [hereinafter CFTC Orders Five Banks to Pay over $1.4 Billion].
165. Barclays to Pay $400 Million Penalty to Settle CFTC Charges of Attempted
Manipulation and False Reporting of Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates, CFTC
(May
20,
2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7181-15
[https://perma.cc/SAJ5-44WN].
166. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068387, at *1 (Nov. 11, 2014).
167. Id. at *2.
168. Id. at *7.
169. Id. (citing In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, CFTC No. 75-14, 1982 WL
30249, at *7 (Dec. 17, 1982)).
170. See supra Part II.A.4.
171. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068387, at *8.
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B.

Department of Justice

1.

Sherman Antitrust Act

Congress first enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 out of
concern regarding growing corporate organization and accompanying
wealth accumulation in the late 1800s.172
The Act consists of two short provisions, providing in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.173
The Clayton Act, passed in 1914, provides the right for private
parties to sue in federal district court for violations of the Sherman
Act where they may receive treble damages and the cost of suit,
including reasonable attorney’s fees.174

2.

Charges Brought by DOJ in FX Manipulation

On May 20, 2015, the Department of Justice Criminal Division and
Antitrust Division released agreements with Citicorp, JPMorgan
Chase, Barclays, RBS, and UBS.175 Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase,
Barclays, and RBS agreed to plead guilty to violations of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and agreed to pay fines totaling $2.5 billion.176 UBS
pleaded guilty to manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR) after breaching its non-prosecution agreement in the
resolution in that case, and agreed to pay a criminal penalty of $203
million.177
The Plea Agreements provide that Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase,
Barclays, and RBS conspired to:

172. Jason A. Casey, The Rule of Reason After Leegin: Reconsidering the Use of
Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Arena, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 919, 922-23
(2009).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014).
174. See id. § 15.
175. These are the same banks the CFTC settle with in November 2014, with the
exception of HSBC. Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas, supra
note 91.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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fix, stabilize, maintain, increase or decrease the price of,
and rig bids and offers for, the euro/U.S. dollar
(“EUR/USD”) currency pair178 exchanged in the foreign
currency exchange spot market (“FX Spot Market”),
which began at least as early as December 2007 and
continued until at least January 2013, by agreeing to
eliminate competition in the purchase and sale of the
EUR/USD currency pair in the United States and
elsewhere, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1.179
All five banks were able to secure waivers from the Securities and
Exchange Commission, allowing the companies to continue operating
business unimpeded by their guilty pleas, including running mutual
funds and issuing stocks, without deep regulatory review.180 At least
one member of the SEC dissented to this decision, citing the
“recidivism of these institutions” and stating that for the SEC to
continually grant these waivers “has effectively rendered criminal
convictions of financial institutions largely symbolic.”181 With these
waivers, the banks proudly boast that these guilty pleas will have no
practical effect on their corporations.182

178. Interestingly, Plea Agreements only charge the banks with fixing the
EUR/USD currency pair. Plea Agreement at 3, United States v. JPMorgan Chase &
Co., No. 3:15-cr-79(SRU) (D. Conn. May 20, 2015); Plea Agreement at 3, United
States v. Citicorp, No. 3:15-cv-78 (SRU) (D. Conn. May 20, 2015); Plea Agreement at
3, United States v. Barclays PLC, No. 3:15-cv-77 (SRU) (D. Conn. May 20, 2015);
Plea Agreement at 3, United States v. Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, No. 3:15-cv-80
(SRU) (D. Conn. May 20, 2015).
179. Id.
180. Aruna Viswanatha, Banks to Pay $5.6 Billion in Probes, WALL STREET J.
(May 20, 2015, 12:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/global-banks-to-pay-5-6billion-in-penalties-in-fx-libor-probe-1432130400 [https://perma.cc/NNC4-W9ET].
181. Kara M. Stein, Public Statement: Dissenting Statement Regarding Certain

Waivers Granted by the Commission for Certain Entities Pleading Guilty to Criminal
Charges Involving Manipulation of Foreign Exchange Rates, SEC (May 21, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/stein-waivers-granted-dissenting-statement.html
[https://perma.cc/AYP3-D9UH] (explaining this was Citigroup’s fifth waiver since
2006, Barclay’s third waiver since 2007, UBS’s seventh waiver since 2008, JPMorgan’s
sixth waive since 2008 and RBSG’s third waiver since 2013).
182. See Gara, supra note 8 (“Citigroup and JPMorgan said . . . that criminal guilty
pleas to collusion are not expected to have a material impact on their operations.”).
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C.

Other U.S. Regulators

1.

Monetary Authorities

The monetary authorities for the United States are the Department
of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve. The Department of the
Treasury is mandated with setting U.S. exchange rate policy since the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and with setting
international financial policy. Practically, it is the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York that implements the Department of Treasury’s
exchange rate policies, and thus these decisions are often made in
consultation with the Federal Reserve.183 The U.S. Federal Reserve
and the U.S. Treasury Department also pay close attention to FX
markets and look for evidence of manipulation.184
In connection to their roles in manipulating the foreign exchange
rates, on May 20, 2015, the Federal Reserve imposed $1.8 billion in
fines collectively against six banks185 in conjunction with the
Department of Justice for “unsafe and unsound practices in the
foreign exchange markets.”186 Along with the fines, the Federal
Reserve issued cease and desist orders requiring each bank to
improve their policies and oversight in the wholesale FX market.187
The Federal Reserve required the banks “to improve senior
management oversight, internal controls, risk management, internal
audit policies, trading activities and procedures,” and prohibits the reemployment of individuals involved in the manipulation scheme.188

2.

U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

On November 12, 2014, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) announced it would impose a total $950 million fine

183. To execute a decision to support or reduce the value of the dollar, the New
York Federal Reserve deals directly with large interbank dealers in the spot market.
To support the value of the dollar, the Federal Reserve will buy dollars and sell
foreign currency. On the other hand, to reduce the price of the dollar, the Federal
Reserve will sell dollars in exchange for foreign currency.
184. Aitken, supra note 4.
185. The fines respectively were: $342 million each for UBS AG, Barclays Bank
PLC, Citigroup Inc., and JPMorgan Chase & Co.; $274 million for Royal Bank of
Scotland PLC (RBS); and $205 million for Bank of America Corporation. Press
Release, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (May 20, 2015, 10:00 AM)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20150520a.htm
[https://perma.cc/2MPH-44JH].
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

168

[Vol. XLIII

on three banks: Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America189
for their role in unsound practices in the FX market.190 The OCC
found the banks lacked sufficient internal controls and failed to detect
traders’ improper business. After their investigation, the OCC
determined:
[T]he traders disclosed confidential bank information,
including customer orders and rate spreads. The
OCC’s examinations also found that traders discussed
activity to trigger trading actions potentially
detrimental to customers and beneficial to the trader
or bank, and discussed pending orders and agreed not
to trade in particular currencies.191

3.

New York Department of Financial Services

On the same day the Department of Justice and Federal Reserve
announced fines and criminal penalties in connection to FX market
manipulation, the New York Department of Financial Services
announced a fine against Barclays in connection with this same
scheme for violations of New York Banking Law.192 In its press
release, the NYDFS added that it would continue to investigate
Barclays’ use of electronic FX trading.193 On November 18, 2015, the
NYDFS announced an additional $150 million fine for Barclays’ use
of its “Last Look” system194 in FX trading.195 The use of this
electronic trading system would automatically reject any orders from
the bank’s customers that would not ultimately be profitable.196
189. The OCC was the only agency to fine Bank of America.
190. OCC Fines Three Banks $950 Million for FX Trading Improprieties, OFF.
COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.occ.treas.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2014/nr-occ-2014-157.html [https://perma.cc/43SJ-WGUG].
191. Id.
192. See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., supra note 103.
193. Id.
194. “The system . . . operated by introducing a hold period between a customer
order being received and it being executed by Barclays. It allowed the bank to root
out trades where the price had moved against them, often in just milliseconds.
Customers . . . would receive messages saying ‘NACK’ (not acknowledged).” Jill
Treanor, Barclays Fined $150m over Forex Trading by New York Regulator,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
18,
2015,
1:03
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/nov/18/barclays-fined-150m-over-forextrading-by-new-york-regulator [https://perma.cc/6N72-S4Z4].
195. Id.
196. Id. Anthony Albanese, New York’s top financial regulator stated: “This case
highlights the need for greater oversight and action to help prevent the misuse of
automated, electronic trading platforms on Wall Street, which is a wider industry
issue that requires serious additional scrutiny.” Id.
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D. International Authorities
The Heads of State and the Government of the Group of Twenty
(G20) established the Financial Stability Board in 2009.197 The
international body of twenty countries seeks to review and promote
international financial stability.198 In response to concerns regarding
the integrity of the FX markets, the Board has issued a report and set
out a number of recommendations to reform the FX market and
benchmark rates.199
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is a financial regulatory
body in the United Kingdom, operating under the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Financial Services Act of 2012.200 Spot transactions
are not deemed to fall under this Act as a qualifying investment, and
therefore, FX spot transactions cannot apply to the market abuse
regime under the FCA’s Code of Market Conduct guidelines.201
On November 12, 2014, the FCA announced they would impose a
$1.7 billion fine on five banks, Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase,
RBS, and UBS, for “failing to control business practices” related to
the FX operations.202 On May 20, 2015, the FCA announced an
additional 284 million GBP (approximately $441 million) fine on
Barclays for the same.203 Noticeably, the fines were imposed because
of the banks’ unsound internal practices, rather than for manipulating
the FX markets.204 The FCA, in connection with the Bank of England
and the HM Treasury,205 also established a review by the three U.K.

197. Our History, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.fsb.org/about/history/
[https://perma.cc/W7K5-HCXC].
198. About the FSB, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, http://www.fsb.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/F3HU-6QMT].
199. See generally FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50.
200. History
of
the
FCA,
FIN.
CONDUCT
AUTHORITY,
https://www.fca.org.uk/about/history [https://perma.cc/K2AX-UK2H].
201. Geoge Tchetvertakov, Global FX Market Regulation Part 1 – A Big Dream
That Requires Even Bigger Ambition, FIN. MAGNATES (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://www.financemagnates.com/forex/analysis/global-fx-market-regulation-part-1big-dream-requires-even-bigger-ambition/ [https://perma.cc/P64M-KPRL].
202. Press Release, Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Fines Five Banks £1.1
Billion for FX Failings and Announces Industry-wide Remediation Programme,
(Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-five-banks-for-fx-failings
[https://perma.cc/SK3G-N9W2] [hereinafter FCA Fines Five Banks £1.1 Billion].
203. Press Release, Fin. Conduct Authority, FCA Fines Barclays £284,432,000 for
Forex Failings (May 20, 2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-barclays-forforex-failings [https://perma.cc/JZ65-B84U].
204. See id.; FCA Fines Five Banks £1.1 Billion, supra note 202.
205. Her Majesty’s Treasury is the UK’s “economic and financial ministry,
maintaining control over public spending, setting direction of the UK’s economic
policy and working to achieve strong and sustainable economic growth.” HM
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authorities to research and make recommendations regarding the
foreign exchange market, along with others.206 This review, called the
Fair and Effective Markets Review, has included recommendations
and is widely cited in considerations of policy and regulatory change
in this market.207
The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) is
“Switzerland’s independent financial-markets regulator.”208 FINMA
issued an order against UBS on November 12, 2014 charging the bank
with attempting to manipulate foreign benchmarks and fining the
bank $139 million.209 FINMA also levied bans from the FX market
against six traders at UBS in December 2015.210 In July, the Brazilian
antitrust agency also began looking into FX manipulation affecting
their currency, the real.211
E.

Internal Banking Regulations

One of the most prominent reasons cited for the regulatory
exemption of the FX markets for decades has been that the market is
regulated by the banks’ internal regulations, and additional regulatory
jurisdiction would be duplicitous.212 Additionally, as explained by the

Treasury,

GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-treasury
[https://perma.cc/39YC-QWMV].
206. Fair
and
Effective
Markets
Review,
BANK
ENG.,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/fmreview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2M7H-SYER].
207. See generally HM TREASURY, BANK OF ENG. & FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FAIR
AND
EFFECTIVE
MARKETS
REVIEW:
FINAL
REPORT
16
(2015),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femrjun15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NE9-RPYB] [hereinafter FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS
REVIEW].
208. FINMA
An
Independent
Supervisory
Authority,
FINMA,
https://www.finma.ch/en/finma/finma-an-overview/ [https://perma.cc/SR4K-S9T3].
209. Kirstin Ridley, Joshua Franklin & Aruna Viswanatha, Regulators Fine Global
Banks $4.3 Billion in Currency Investigation, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2014, 5:10 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-banks-forex-settlement-cftcidUSKCN0IW0E520141112#dekZUmd69obx9eGt.97 [https://perma.cc/2J4J-DCV2].
210. Jeff Patterson, FINMA Cracks Down on Former UBS FX Employees,
FIN.
MAGNATES
(Dec.
17,
2015),
Lobbying
Industry
Bans,
http://www.financemagnates.com/institutional-forex/regulation/finma-cracks-downon-former-ubs-fx-employees-lobbying-industry-bans/ [https://perma.cc/6A2J-Q8HS].
211. Jeffrey T. Lewis & Rogerio Jelmayer, Brazil Antitrust Agency Investigating
Banks for Suspected Rate Manipulation, WALL STREET J. (July 2, 2015, 4:17 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/brazil-antitrust-agency-investigating-banks-forsuspected-rate-manipulation-1435850570?alg=y [https://perma.cc/EN94-SHAX].
212. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 23 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843,
5863; Tormey, supra note 121, at 2370-71 (“CFTC regulation would be superfluous
and unnecessary encumbrance of the industry’s efficiency.”).
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Final Report of the Fair and Effective Markets Review, published in
June 2015: “[r]eflecting the challenge of devising a single global
regulatory framework for a market that trades around the clock
across multiple jurisdictions, standards in spot FX have historically
been guided by voluntary sets of principles drawn up on a national
basis.”213 Yet, the report goes on to state: “[i]t became clear through
recent enforcement cases that few firms had integrated the provisions
of these codes into their internal control systems.”214 In fact, each
regulatory body to bring charges or fines against the banks in
connection with the FX manipulation, cited to the lack of internal
controls and adequate oversight policies in addition to manipulation
charges, if not exclusively.215 As a result, the banks have agreed to
revamp their internal control structure and policies and procedures in
order to address the issues exposed in light of these investigations.216
F.

Repercussions of the Manipulation Scheme

The effects of the FX manipulation scheme are far from over. As
of yet, more than thirty traders have been fired,217 while one RBS
trader was arrested in December 2014 although he was not charged

213. FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 14.
214. Id.
215. See CFTC Orders Five Banks to Pay over $1.4 Billion, supra note 164 (In
addition to finding collusion, “[t]he Orders [from the CFTC] also find that the Banks
failed to adequately assess the risks associated with their FX traders participating in
the fixing of certain FX benchmark rates and lacked adequate internal controls in
order to prevent improper communications by traders. In addition, the Banks lacked
sufficient policies, procedures and training specifically governing participation in
trading around the FX benchmarks rates; and had inadequate policies pertaining to,
or sufficient oversight of, their FX traders’ use of chat rooms or other electronic
messaging”); see also Plea Agreement at 10-11, United States v. Citicorp, No. 3:15-cv78 (SRU) (D. Conn. May 20, 2015); Press Release, supra note 187 (“The Federal
Reserve on Wednesday announced it will impose fines totaling more than $1.8 billion
against six major banking organizations for their unsafe and unsound practices in the
foreign exchange (FX) markets . . . . The Federal Reserve also issued cease and desist
orders requiring the firms to improve their policies and procedures for oversight and
controls over activities in the wholesale FX and similar types of markets.”).
216. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
217. Suzi Ring & Kit Chelle, Fired Currency Traders Won’t Leave Quietly,
(Sept.
14,
2015,
7:00
PM),
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-14/fired-currency-traders-won-tleave-quietly-as-lawsuits-mount [https://perma.cc/GYQ2-KSDC] (last updated Sept.
15, 2015, 6:32 AM) (explaining that fired employees are now suing the banks,
claiming to have been a scapegoat for failing to stop the manipulation of currency
benchmarks.); see also Steve Slater, Former RBS FX Trader Joins List of Ex-bankers
REUTERS
(Sept.
16,
2015,
10:23
AM),
Suing
over
Dismissals,
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/internal_ReutersNewsRoom_ExclusivesAndWins_
MOLT/idUSKCN0RG1YF20150916 [https://perma.cc/8E83-LP39].
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with an offense.218 Private lawsuits219 have been filed in the U.K. and
the United States even before the investigation results were released
and the banks pleaded guilty; some have been consolidated, some
have settled, and some are outstanding.220 A further seven banks
continue to face litigation in the United States from investors over
forex rigging, including Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, and
Standard Chartered.221 Bank of America settled a private lawsuit for
its conduct in the FX scheme on April 29, 2015 for $180 million.222
The economic impact of the scheme is difficult to define precisely.
The manipulation “inflated the banks’ profits while harming countless
consumers, investors and institutions around the globe — from
pension funds to major corporations, and including the banks’ own
customers,” according to U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch.223
Britain’s chief market regulator recently called the exchange rate
manipulation scheme the “biggest series of quantifiable wrongdoing
in the history of our financial services industry.”224 As a result, the
market expected a significant increase in regulation, although that has
not happened quite yet.225

218. Jaimie McGeever & Kirstin Ridley, Arrested RBS Forex Trader Named as
REUTERS
(Jan.
8,
2015,
10:23
AM),
Nash:
Sources,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-forex-rbs-court-idUSKBN0KH1IZ20150108
[https://perma.cc/A9YW-5YRJ].
219. In addition to a private right of action stemming from violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, Section 22 of the CEA provides for a private right of action
for violations of the Act, for several categories of conduct, available to “any person
who sustains loss as a result of any alleged violation of the chapter.” 7 U.S.C. §
25(a)(2) (2014).
220. See Maya Rajamani, Futures Traders Folded Into Forex OTC Litigation,
LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/691809/futurestraders-folded-into-forex-otc-litigation [https://perma.cc/K8CV-U5MG].
221. Elizabeth Fry, Global Banks Face More Litigation from Angry Investors,
BANKING
&
FIN.
(Dec.
24,
2015),
AUSTL.
https://www.australianbankingfinance.com/banking/global-banks-face-morelitigation-from-angry-investors/ [https://perma.cc/2H2E-XBV9].
222. Christina Rexrode, Bank of America to Pay $180 Million to Settle Investors’
Forex Lawsuit, WALL STREET J. (April 29, 2015, 6:06 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/bank-of-america-to-pay-180-million-to-settle-privateforex-lawsuit-1430340190 [https://perma.cc/X6KR-AZ64].
223. McCoy & Johnson, supra note 97.
224. Pam Martens, Top UK Regulator: People Have Good Reason Not to Trust
Currency Rates Set By Big Banks, WALL STREET ON PARADE (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://wallstreetonparade.com/2014/02/top-uk-regulator-people-have-good-reasonnot-to-trust-currency-rates-set-by-big-banks/ [https://perma.cc/G3RH-784B].
225. See Baert, supra note 10; Jeff Patterson, Regulatory Changes Coming Amid
Vulnerabilities in FX, Swaps Compliance, FIN. MAGNATES (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.financemagnates.com/forex/regulation/regulatory-changes-coming-amidvulnerabilities-in-fx-swaps-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/75UU-TA9K].
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As it stands, there is no agency with regulatory jurisdiction over the
spot market.
While the CFTC and DOJ prohibit and have
enforcement authority over manipulation and collusion, respectively,
there has yet to be any practical consequence of this manipulation
scheme.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATORY PROPOSALS
In light of the manipulation scandal, one contention that is largely
understood is that change is inevitable in the FX market. The
prospect of new regulations or internal controls are expected to soon
change the landscape of the market, “and plenty of potential solutions
have been supplied, including creating a banking union, introducing a
single-reserve currency, creating one global regulator, or putting FX
trading on exchange, giving as a few examples.”226 However, it is far
from agreed upon what these new regulations will look like and if
they should come at all. This Part discusses positions against and for
additional regulations and various proposals for the FX market. Part
A details a number of arguments against additional regulations in the
market. Part B provides an explanation of those arguments for new
regulations and oversight. Part C provides an explanation of the
criminal jurisdiction over the foreign currency market and the
criminal consequences of the scheme.
A. The Market Should Remain Unregulated
The FX market, and the spot market in particular, is one of selfregulation. No agency monitors or has authority over it.227 The few
regulations that exist stem from firms’ obligations as financial
institutions and are governed by banking regulators.228 The banks
themselves, who have adamantly argued for the preservation of this
model,229 enforce these regulations and guidelines internally.230 One

Tchetvertakov, supra note 203.
Aitken, supra note 4.
See supra note 134-36 and accompanying text.
Patrick Graham, Troubled FX Industry Set to Defend ‘Self-regulation’,
REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-forexcongress-idUSBREA2P15020140326 [https://perma.cc/EFX6-2L6G].
230. LMAX EXCH., RESTORING TRUST IN GLOBAL FX MARKETS: STRIKING A
BALANCE
BETWEEN
TRANSPARENCY
AND
EFFICIENCY
25
(2015),
https://www.lmax.com/restoring-trust-report
[https://perma.cc/28J8-SQW6]
[hereinafter RESTORING TRUST] (“To date, the FX market has always relied on selfregulation. There is unease, therefore, at the idea that too much regulatory power
will be ceded to external parties. Accordingly, some within the industry prefer to
226.
227.
228.
229.
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important reason for this regulatory model is that market
participants, major international banks, are all financially
sophisticated and do not require the protection of regulations like
those in the securities or derivatives market.231 The market’s
international nature made comprehensive regulation impracticable
and due to its massive size, the market was thought to be highly
unlikely to be susceptible to manipulation. As stated in 2012:
“Fortunately, the FX market is sufficiently liquid that significant
manipulation by any single actor is all but impossible during active
trading hours for the major currencies.”232 Thus, the spot market has
historically been free from intrusive regulations.
Derivatives have all come under some form of regulation because
of their speculative nature and inherent risk. Spots have escaped such
regulation because it is simply a sale of one currency for another – an
even exchange at a negotiated price by two parties. The Fourth
Circuit explained, “[t]ransactions in the commodity itself which
anticipate actual delivery did not present the same opportunities for
speculation, manipulation, and outright wagering that trading in
futures and options presented.”233 It is for this reason that the CEA
has long excluded spot transactions explicitly from its regulations.
Another reason cited for the lack of regulation in the spot FX
market is that the market is self-regulating, in that the participants
ensure the best prices and best practices even absent regulation.
They are said to value their autonomy and try to ensure the integrity
of the market. A central banker once said, “[i]t’s an entirely
professional market and there’s honour among thieves.
The
participants are keen on a clean market, not least because of the risk
to reputation.”234 Similarly, the FX market was subject to market
discipline.235 Purchasing firms and retail customers could withdraw

stress the importance of restoring codes of conduct, rather than imposing new
rules.”).
231. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 49-50 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5843, 5887-88 (emphasis in original) (“The participants in this market are
sophisticated and informed institutions, unlike the participants on organized
exchanges, which, in some cases, include individuals and small traders who may need
to be protected by some form of governmental regulation.”).
232. King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 8.
233. Tauber, 8 F.3d at 970-71.
234. Lee Oliver, From the Archive: Does FX Need Best-execution Regulations?,
EUROMONEY (May 2006), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1039431/From-thearchive-Does-FX-need-best-execution-regulations.html
[https://perma.cc/Y2A3D5W8].
235. See Andrew Hauser, Director of Markets Strategy, Bank of Eng., and Head of
the Fair and Effective Markets Review Secretariat, Realigning Private and Public
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their business if they suspected misconduct among any of the other
participants.236 The prospect of losing this business was said to have
been a sufficient deterrent in itself to prevent misconduct.237
Regulations on the FX market would also impede efficiency and
liquidity.238 The market participants are already a part of a highly
regulated industry, and would be “more properly supervised by the
bank regulatory agencies.”239 It is generally understood that any
increase in transparency will come at a price, negatively affecting
liquidity, which is said to be the beating heart of the global FX
market.240 Regulation, which tends to lock in prices and obstruct
necessary flexibility that has thus far been a touchstone of the FX
market, would also impede further evolution of the market through
the use of technology.241
In addition to their impediment on market efficiency, many argue
that regulations are simply not necessary and would not actually solve
the issues facing the FX market today. To think even a global
regulatory scheme will prevent collusion among top-tiered banks is
probably a naïve assumption.242 These market makers will “always
have an opportunity to ‘fix’ benchmark prices.”243 No amount of
regulations can universally solve the issue of market manipulation,
but will only serve to shift the details of its origin and structure.244

Interests in Wholesale Financial Markets: The Fair and Effective Markets Review
(Jan.
29,
2015),
in
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech795.p
df [https://perma.cc/5NV9-RQ39] (“To put it bluntly, firms knew that an attempt by
them to abuse the interests of others in the market today could be punished by the
removal of large quantities of lucrative business tomorrow. And that knowledge was
thought to be the most powerful way of sustaining broadly well-functioning and
sound markets.”).
236. FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 25.
237. Id.
238. See Tormey, supra note 121, at 2357 (“CFTC regulation would be superfluous
and unnecessary encumbrance of the industry’s efficiency.”).
239. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 22 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843,
5863.
240. Elliot Holley, FX Industry Must Act Now or Face Regulation Warns LMAX,
BANKING TECH. (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.bankingtech.com/388002/fx-industrymust-act-now-or-face-regulation-warns-lmax/ [https://perma.cc/LUC3-DMCX].
241. Oliver, supra note 236.
242. See George Tchetvertakov, Global FX Market Regulation – A Big Dream
That Requires Even Bigger Ambition, Part 2, FIN. MAGNATES (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://www.financemagnates.com/forex/analysis/global-fx-market-regulation-bigdream-requires-even-bigger-ambition-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/X9JL-QTAK].
243. Id.
244. See id.
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Increased regulations in the United States may incentivize big
banks to take their business to other nations without such intrusive
laws. Banks may change the focus of their business to other countries
or move their entire business offshore,245 posing a detriment to the
U.S. markets.246 New regulations in the United States in a global
market could also cause “fragmentation . . . regulatory arbitrage,247
and in the worst case . . . a race to the bottom.”248 One fear is that
new regulations would either cause market prices to vary, not because
of the supply or demand of the market but exclusively because of the
effect of the regulations themselves, creating a disparity of prices. An
additional concern is that countries would compete with each other to
create the most appealing regulatory scheme to financial institutions
in order to attract their business, and ultimately harm the market
itself because of ineffective regulations.
Finally, many argue that the FX market should not come under the
view of a strict regulatory scheme because of the “unintended
consequences” that could result. This same concern was raised by
both the U.S. Treasury Department regarding the regulation of FX
instruments249
and
the
Association
for
Financial Markets in Europe regarding the possible results of
regulating the FX market in Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive II (MiFID II), a new piece of legislation for financial reform
in Europe.250 Likewise, others have implored that regulators do not
enact a legal regime out of “hysteria and ignorance,”251 regulating for
the sake of regulating instead of carefully identifying what exactly
would solve the issues faced by the FX market today.

245. Tormey, supra note 121, at 2359-60.
246. Id.; see also King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 8 (“Governments have
learned through experience that dealers will simply move elsewhere if they are
regulated. In the 1960s, for example, bond dealers simply moved offshore when the
U.S government attempted to regulate the foreign issuance of US dollar
denominated bonds in the domestic market.”).
247. Arbitrage “is a trade that profits by exploiting price differences of identical or
similar financial instruments, on different markets or in different forms.” Arbitrage,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arbitrage.asp#ixzz3vD6D6OpO
[https://perma.cc/EH8U-GJTH].
248. GEORGE UGEUX, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE REGULATION: THE QUEST FOR
FINANCIAL STABILITY 1 (2014) (quoting IOSCO Director General David Wright).
249. Brush, supra note 143.
250. Aitken, supra note 4.
251. BHALA, supra note 35, at 38.
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1.

Proposals to Maintain Self-Regulation

Many international regulatory bodies seem to support the selfregulatory model in citing the banks’ internal failures as the purpose
for the manipulation. On March 30, 2015, eight foreign exchange
committees from different nations came together and published a
“Global Preamble: Codes of Best Market Practice and Shared Global
Principles.”252 The Global Preamble serves as guidance of ethical
standards and behavior for the industry regarding a number of
practices, including client confidentiality and market conduct,
personal conduct, and policies for best execution practices.253 In its
Fair and Effective Markets Review, the Financial Conduct Authority
and the Bank of England recommend the adoption of a single code of
conduct for the industry.254 In addition, the Bank of International
Settlement set up a working group to develop behavior standards for
FX traders, building off of the established framework of the Global
Preamble.255 This code will go into effect in May 2017.256 It will be up
to the banks and each government to enforce the rules and it is
unclear what, if any, consequences there will be to violations.257
Other changes have been aimed at reducing the possibility of
trader manipulation in the way trades are actually carried out. For
example, since the manipulation scheme has come to light there has
been an increased use of algorithmic trading.258 One estimate suggests
that 90% of orders are placed using algorithms, compared with about

252. See GLOBAL PREAMBLE: CODES OF BEST MARKET PRACTICE AND SHARED
GLOBAL
PRINCIPLES
(2015),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/groups/pdf/fxcg/global_preamble.pdf?6ba97a4cd5ce
1e57c965e7461443cc0c [https://perma.cc/37XV-7Z29].
253. See id.
254. See FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 7.
255. Chiara Albanese, BIS Calls For Single FX Code of Conduct, WALL STREET
JOURNAL:
MONEYBEAT
(May
11,
2015,
11:45
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/05/11/bis-calls-for-single-fx-code-of-conduct/
[https://perma.cc/K75D-8EPV] [hereinafter Albanese, BIS Calls For Single FX Code
of Conduct].
256. Patrick Graham & Huw Jones, New Global Forex Code to Take Effect in
May 2017, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2015, 12:01 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/marketsforex-regulations-idUKL5N11F1XK20150909 [https://perma.cc/MKB3-4X7V].
257. Id. (“[T]he biggest challenge [is] to devise ways of making banks and other
participants stick to the new code . . . . The code won’t have the status of formal,
binding regulation and it will be up to governments how it could be enforced.”).
258. Albanese, Forex Scandal Drives Shift to Algo Trading, supra note 84.
Algorithmic trading “utilizes very advanced mathematical models for making
transaction decisions in the financial markets.” Algorithmic Trading, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/algorithmictrading.asp [https://perma.cc/X5QNY8VZ].
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5% before the manipulation investigation.259 With the use of these
algorithms, banks can simply act as an intermediary when taking
client orders in providing the service of connecting the orders to
trading platforms rather than taking on the order, and the risk,
themselves.260 In exchange, instead of making a profit off of the
clients’ positions, banks charge a fee for this service.261
B.

Regulations are Necessary

Since the FX market manipulation scheme has become public,
there are also advocates in favor of creating a regulatory regime for
the still unregulated spot FX market. One thing these advocates
agree on is the ineffectiveness of internal banking controls. In 2001,
sixteen of the top banks signed a voluntary code of conduct for their
practices in the FX market.262 A standard code of conduct presents a
fundamental issue: that it remains up to the banks to implement them
on their own.263 The Financial Conduct Authority stated, “[t]he
banks’ failures to establish adequate systems and controls are what
allowed the traders to manipulate the fixed rate across the world’s
largest currencies.”264 Simon Potter, head of markets at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York said that, previously, banks may have
intentionally disregarded the industry’s best practices, identifying an
important issue in the self-regulatory model.265
Even with new internal controls, regulators are still advocating for
more to be done. 266 Officials from central banks across the world
have warned banks that “more restrictive regulation is inevitable” if
they did not act on new standards and recommendations.267 Others
suggest that even if banks successfully implement codes of conduct,

259. Albanese, Forex Scandal Drives Shift to Algo Trading, supra note 84.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Vaughan, Finch & Choudhury, supra note 1. This code was later included in a
set of guidelines issued by the Bank of England in 2011. Id.
263. See id. (“The thing about the code is it is a voluntary code. It may be that
compliance with that has almost been seen as optional.”).
264. Bray, Anderson & Protess, supra note 89.
265. Katy Burne, NY Fed Official to Currency Traders: Adhere to Industry Best
Practices, WALL STREET J. (July 14, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ny-fed-officialto-currency-traders-adhere-to-industry-best-practices-1436879710
[https://perma.cc/T8CW-QGLB].
266. See Chiara Albanese, Currencies Trading Needs Further Cleanup, Regulators
Say, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/currencies-tradingneeds-further-cleanup-regulators-say-1443699941?alg=y
[https://perma.cc/5VA96E9C]; Albanese, BIS Calls For Single FX Code of Conduct, supra note 257.
267. Burne, supra note 267.
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that will not be enough. Codes of conduct will be a “complement to
regulation,” but regulation will still be necessary.268
An independent review by the Bank of England explained that the
structure of the FX market lends itself to “conflicts of interests;
limited transparency; poor benchmark design; market concentration;
and a reduction in the effectiveness of market discipline.”269
Specifically, some financial actors thought transparency was enhanced
by the increased use of electronic systems.270 Yet, a recent study
discovered that 80% of market participants think the FX market
needs more transparency.271 Another article explains, “there is an
almost complete lack of transparency in forex.”272 Thus, it is clear
that the transparency gained by the use of electronic systems is not
nearly enough for investors to be made aware of the specific data
necessary to provide clarity to the now opaque market. It is
commonly accepted that transparency should be the common goal of
the market despite whatever costs may come with it.273
Similarly, the FX market was thought to have been governed by
the discipline of the market. Banks understood they would lose
business if it was discovered that they attempted to abuse the market,
“[a]nd that knowledge was thought to be the most powerful way of
sustaining broadly well-functioning and sound markets.”274 The
understanding that this is not actually how the market works has left a
leader in the industry to even question the value of a debate of
whether there ever “was a historic ‘golden age’ when the real world
actually worked like this.”275 The Fair and Effective Markets Review

268. Simon M. Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group, Fed. Res.
Bank of N.Y., Trends in Foreign Exchange Markets and the Challenges Ahead 8
(July 15, 2015), in http://www.bis.org/review/r150721f.pdf [https://perma.cc/TET6XQNW].
269. HM TREASURY, BANK OF ENG. & FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HOW FAIR AND
EFFECTIVE ARE THE FIXED INCOME, FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND COMMODITIES
MARKETS?
3
(2014),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femr/consultation271014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6L75-VYVK].
270. King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 24.
271. Elliot Holley, supra note 242.
272. Gregg Fields, A Fixed Game? Institutional Corruption Charges Taint Global
Markets – Again., HARV. U.: EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/fixed-game [https://perma.cc/SZ8G-M5JN] (“When it
comes to how exchange rates are set . . . [a] client doesn’t have any independent way
of knowing, for instance, if the price is good or bad relative to what others are
paying.”).
273. RESTORING TRUST, supra note 230, at 5.
274. Hauser, supra note 235.
275. Id.
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found that market discipline was either lacking or non-existent in FX.
276 This is because of three reasons: there are few alternative firms
to buy from if misconduct is discovered; the need to maintain
relationships with other firms; and the difficulty of detecting market
abuse.277 This mismatch between the financial interests of the banks
and their shareholders and those of society is now widely
understood.278
In response to concerns about efficiency, advocates for regulation
note that much of what makes the FX market efficient would be
deemed illegal in other markets.279 A notable example is the practice
of front-running, which is legal in the FX market.280 Front-running is
defined as “the practice whereby an individual is trading in possession
of private information about an order designed to take advantage of
the anticipated price effect of a future order.”281 In FX front-running,
once a bank receives an order to be placed at the fix rate, banks trade
in the opposite direction as their customers in order to hedge against
market shifts. For example, if a client placed an order to buy 500
million euros to be executed at the fix price, which at that time was
$1.1200, a trader would begin to buy euros in the market.282 This
activity would begin to push the price up so that the trader would sell
the euros for $1.1250 to the customer when he purchased them at an

276. FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 25.
277. Id.
278. Justin Fox, How Shareholders Are Ruining American Business, ATLANTIC
(July 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/07/stop-spoiling-theshareholders/309381/ [https://perma.cc/B9G9-UX8W].
279. See Sid Verma, FX Fixing Controversy Is So 2006: What They Said Back
Then, EUROMONEY (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3321671/FXfixing-controversy-is-so-2006-what-they-said-back-then.html [https://perma.cc/BB6KRU7F] (“Another issue hardly anybody is prepared to speak about on the record but
which has been referred to, is that many of the very practices that help make FX so
efficient would most definitely be frowned on or even deemed illegal in other
markets and will almost certainly not pass muster in a market that falls under Mifid’s
scope. Pre-empting orders, if not even actually front-running them – and there is a
subtle but important difference – is almost the norm in FX. However, very few banks
are prepared to admit it.”).
280. King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 8. Despite the fact that front-running is
technically legal in the FX market, the SDNY denied a motion to dismiss in a civil
case against twelve defendant banks in connection to the FX manipulation, citing
front-running as an example of the misconduct. See In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark
Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 587-88, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
281. FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 104.
282. See Matt Levine, RBS Promises Not to Trade Against Clients Too Much,
VIEW
(Oct.
30,
2013,
2:14
PM),
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-10-30/rbs-promises-not-to-tradeagainst-clients-too-much [https://perma.cc/KK74-4KFM].
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average rate of $1.1225. The bank’s profit would be $.0025. Banks
argue this is a necessary practice in risk management, to protect
against market volatility and the chance that the price would drop
when they promise to trade at the fix price.283 On the other hand, the
customer ends up paying a higher price than he would have without
this practice.284
Although front-running is illegal in other markets, in the FX
market, reports have characterized this practice in a number of ways
such as “part of the game” in FX trading with “absolutely no legal
repercussions”285 to “bad practice” 286 to “unacceptable.”287 Market
participants indicated a need for clarification of the fine line between
acceptable hedging and unacceptable front-running of client orders.288
In any event, collusive front-running has never been acceptable in any
market, including FX.
Along with the need to provide clarity is the need to protect
market integrity and to recreate public trust where it has been lost.289
The loss of public trust in the FX market has been a detriment to its
efficiency, created uncertainty among investors, and increased the
cost of management, resources, and compensation necessary to risk
taking.290 To rebuild the public trust in the market, the Fair and
Efficient Market Review recommends both domestic regulatory
reform, and international cooperation among regulators.291

1.

Proposals/Solutions

The industry has widely come to terms with the inevitability of
change to the market, and the call for a global reform is nearly
universal in proposals to response to the FX market manipulation.292
The globalization of the financial markets demands consistency and
283. See id.
284. See id. RBS has tried to negate the deceptive nature of such practices by
informing its clients of its front running practices. See id.
285. AGUSTIN SILVANI, BEAT THE FOREX DEALER: AN INSIDER’S LOOK INTO
TRADING TODAY’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 11 (2006).
286. King, Osler & Rime, supra note 51, at 8.
287. Tom Young, FCA’s Wheatly: Lawyers Must Engage in Forex Principles, INT’L
FIN. L. REV. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3430823/FCAs-Wheatleylawyers-must-engage-in-forex-principles.html [https://perma.cc/X3NP-EBPW].
288. FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 52.
289. Hauser, supra note 235.
290. Id.
291. FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 5-6.
292. See RESTORING TRUST, supra note 230, at 27 (“While the industry accepts that
change is inevitable, ultimately that change must be developed and agreed upon
within the market, on a global basis.”).
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cooperation in both regulatory development and implementation.293
Any new regulatory regime, without global coordination risks
“fragmentation . . . regulatory arbitrage, and in the worst case . . . a
race to the bottom.”294 In providing its recommendations, the Bank of
England agreed that, provided the international scope of the FX
markets, it is vital that the governing principles should be agreed to
internationally.295
There has been a move to change the structure of market
operations, with the goal of preventing opportunities for market
abuse. The WM/Reuters benchmark timeframe has been increased to
five minutes from the previous one-minute window and now obtains
data from a wider range of sources in the calculation.296 While this
has reduced the scope of manipulation, it has also reportedly
decreased market liquidity, as banks respond to “greater uncertainty
over the fix level,” by increasing bid-offer spreads.297 This is reported
to have increased trading costs by about 37%.298 The FX benchmark,
along with six other financial benchmarks, has also been brought
under the U.K. regulatory regime as of April 2015.299
There are also proposals of imposing regulations on the market.
Some suggest putting the FX market on central trading exchanges.300
Advocates argue this would increase transparency, and limit the

293. Id. at 25.
294. UGEUX, supra note 248, at 1.
295. FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 13. The need for
global coordination is seen in other industries, such as the securities market as well.
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296. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 50, at 3.
297. Lawsuits Bring Renewed Attention to FX Transaction Costs, COOCONNECT
(June 16, 2015), http://cooconnect.com/feature/lawsuits-bring-renewed-attention-tofx-transaction-costs [https://perma.cc/N45T-DYJW].
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2015,
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possibility of manipulation.301 On the other hand, critics argue this
would hamper competition and innovation, create risks and push up
prices.302 The Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England
have also identified the lack of regulatory jurisdiction over the spot
FX market as an issue in their Fair and Efficient Markets Review.303
They have proposed a new civil and criminal market abuse regime to
be created for the spot market specifically.304
C.

Criminal Sanctions

As a result of the manipulation scheme, four banks pled guilty to
the Department of Justice to violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, punishable by a prison term of up to ten years for an individual.
Six banks settled charges of attempted manipulation with the CFTC,
a crime also punishable by a prison term of up to ten years for an
individual found guilty. Yet, no individual traders have been
prosecuted for this egregious misconduct.
This is not due to a general policy decision by the Department of
Justice not to prosecute antitrust or market manipulation crimes. The
Antitrust Department charged sixty-three individuals with criminal
offenses in 2012, thirty-four in 2013, and forty-four in 2014.305
Nineteen executives were charged and four executives were sent to
prison for price fixing in the airline industry in 2011.306 In the year
leading up to its Spring 2015 report, the Antitrust Department
charged thirty individuals in connection with real estate foreclosure
auctions.307

301. See id.
302. Phillip Stafford, Banks Face Erosion of Business Around Currency Fix, FIN.
TIMES: FT TRADING ROOM (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8458f4d66862-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5.html#axzz40BqdrzKm [https://perma.cc/PAF5-RK2H].
303. FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 13.
304. See id. at 57 (“So, although some of the behaviours witnessed in the recent FX
cases might be caught where behaviour in the spot FX market affects a financial
instrument (such as an FX derivative) or a benchmark, others which relate
exclusively to the spot FX market — including front running client orders and other
forms of market manipulation — will not.”).
305. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2005-2014, at
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(Mar.
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In addition to antitrust charges, the U.S. Department of Justice and
authorities around the world have taken criminal action against
traders who manipulate the markets.308 In November 2015, a jury in
the Southern District of New York found two traders guilty of
conspiracy and wire fraud in connection with the manipulation of
LIBOR.309 A LIBOR trader in London was found guilty in August
2015 and sentenced to eleven years in prison upon appeal in
December of that same year for manipulating the benchmark.310
Similarly, commodities trader Michael Coscia was the first person to
have been charged with the CFTC’s new anti-spoofing311 authority
under the Dodd-Frank Act and was found guilty by a jury in
November 2015.312
The CFTC also likely has authority to bring criminal charges in
connection with the FX manipulation. As it stands, the Commodities
Exchange Act makes it a felony to manipulate commodities. The
requirements for attempted manipulation are: (1) an intent and (2) an
overt act in furtherance of that intent. Regarding the intent element,
the circuits are split regarding whether fraud is necessary to charge
this offense.313 As explained below, the Fifth Circuit requires a
showing of fraud or manipulation, whereas the Second Circuit does
not.
In United States v. Radley, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a decision to
grant a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment for manipulation
under the CEA because the conduct charged involved only legitimate

308. Nate Raymond & Brendan Pierson, Former Rabobank Traders Convicted in
over Libor Rigging, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2015, 5:06 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-rabobank-libor-trial-idUSKCN0SU2HX20151105
[https://perma.cc/KD3H-SDGD].
309. Id.
310. Margot Patrick, Former Libor Trader Tom Hayes Gets Prison Sentence Cut
to 11 Years, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 21, 2015, 11:56 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/former-trader-tom-hayes-gets-prison-sentence-cut-to-11years-1450708815 [https://perma.cc/GSG4-APA3].
311. “Spoofing, criminalized as part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, occurs when
traders trick other investors’ algorithms by entering their own buy or sell orders with
no intention of filling them.” Brian Louis, Annie Massa & Janan Hanna, From Pits to
Algos, an Old-School Trader Makes Leap to Spoofing, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2015,
5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-12/from-pits-to-algos-anold-school-trader-makes-leap-to-spoofing [https://perma.cc/XQX6-KMDF].
312. Id.
313. One scholar has referred to this as the open-market, closed-market debate.
See JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
MANIPULATION 385 (2014).
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trades in the market place and created legally enforceable contracts.314
The Court explained: “[a]cting in a manner that shifts the price of a
commodity in a favorable direction is the business of profit-making
enterprises, and if it is done without fraud or misrepresentation, it
does not clearly violate the CEA.”315 The Court specified that it
supported its conclusion with an analysis of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act Section 10(b) in securities manipulation cases.316
In CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC, the Southern District of
New York distinguished manipulation under the CEA and the
Securities Exchange Act. The Court noted that Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act prohibited both fraud and manipulation,
whereas the CEA has two separate sections for anti-fraud and antimanipulation provisions, finding “[w]hen the statute distinguishes
fraud and manipulation by addressing them in different provisions, it
would be redundant to construe manipulation to require a fraud
element.”317 The Court ultimately concluded that the only requisite
intent necessary to pursue a manipulation charge under the CEA was
“that the accused acted (or failed to act) with the purpose or
conscious object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the
market that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and
demand.”318 This was the definition the CFTC cited in their
settlement agreements with the banks for attempted manipulation.319
The CFTC has taken the position of the Second Circuit in
promulgating its anti-manipulation authority under the Dodd-Frank
Act in its adoption of Rule 180.2.320 The Commission “emphasizes,
consistent with the weight of existing precedent, that the conduct
giving rise to a manipulation charge need not itself be fraudulent or
otherwise illegal.”321 Yet, despite this explanation of the CFTC’s

314. United States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803, 820-21 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d,
632 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2011).
315. Id. at 816.
316. Id. at 816 n.5.
317. CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 534 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
318. Id. at 532.
319. See, e.g., In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 6068387, at *7 (Nov. 11,
2014).
320. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2015).
321. Prohibition of Market Manipulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 67657, 67661 (proposed
Nov. 3, 2010). In adopting this position, the Commission cited the following cases: In
re Zenith-Godley Co., Inc. and John McClay, Jr., 6 Agric. Dec. 900 (1947)
(extravagant purchases of butter for the purpose of supporting milk prices); In re
Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1155 (1971); In re DiPlacido, CFTC No. 01-23, 2008 WL

186

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

interpretation, the law has not yet been settled.322 The dispute
remains open and a resolution may have to be decided ultimately by
the Supreme Court.323
Aside from the issue of the requisite intent needed to charge a
defendant, there is a dispute about whether or not, even with the
statutory authority to do so, it would be an effective policy to charge
individual traders at all. Those against charging individual traders
contend that “[a]ggressive traders will become timid if they are
punished” both when their trading strategies do not turn out
favorably or if their strategies are too successful and they make large
profits to the detriment of other market participants.324 This chilling
effect would come from other participants accusing traders of market
manipulation or unfair practices if they are too successful and the
trader’s own firms or clients punishing them if their strategies are
unsuccessful. Another argument is that traders should not be
prosecuted for their activities when they were performed at the
behest of senior management who either knew, or stayed willingly
blind to their traders’ misconduct.325
On the other hand, not prosecuting the traders who actually
committed these crimes, and allowing them to walk without
consequence, is an ineffective criminal policy. A common strategy
among defense attorneys representing corporations and their
employees was to negotiate a deal where the corporation would plead
guilty and pay a fee, in exchange for employees not being charged.326
Such a settlement policy has no deterrent effect whatsoever, either
specifically against the individuals involved or generally against
financial crime.
Although the Department of Justice obtained felony pleas from the
corporations, the banks themselves acknowledge that their guilty
pleas are not expected to have any practical impact on their
4831204 (Nov. 5, 2008), aff’d in pertinent part, DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 Fed.Appx.
657, 2009 WL 3326624 (2d Cir. 2009).
322. See, e.g., CFTC v. Hunter, No. 07 CIV. 6682(BSJ)( FM), 2012 WL 297838, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012).
323. MARKHAM, supra note 313, at 385.
324. Id.
325. See Yves Smith, Libor Trader Sentenced to 14 Years for Market
Manipulation. So What About His Bosses?, NAKED CAPITALISM (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/08/libor-trader-sentenced-to-14-years-formarket-manipulation-so-what-about-his-bosses.html [https://perma.cc/J75M-X3W8].
326. Steven John Fellman, Department of Justice Targets Corporate Officers in
Both Civil and Criminal Enforcement Actions, GKG LAW (2015),
http://www.gkglaw.com/site/files/doj_targets_corp_officers00340912.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FAR-2C3L].

2016]FILLING THE REGULATORY VOID IN THE FX 187
operations.327 This is evidenced in that, despite hefty fines, most of
the banks did not suffer any financial losses.328 An SDNY judge
argues that not bringing charges against individuals “depicts weakness
in the prosecutorial system.”329 Larry Breur, once head of the
Criminal Division at the DOJ said “[t]he strongest deterrent against
corporate crime is the prospect of prison time for individual
employees.”330 The complete lack of punishment altogether may in
fact reward this criminal behavior and incentivize such crimes, as
evidenced by the repeated misconduct by the same institutions.331
In reaction to these criticisms, the Department of Justice released a
memo in September 2015 stating that it would begin to focus its
resources on the prosecution of individual executives.332 In releasing
its new policy, the DOJ acknowledged that there had not been many
individual convictions within the financial sector and emphasized that
it will work to ensure an equal enforcement of the law for those “on a
street corner or in a boardroom” alike.333 The practical effects of this
position are yet to be seen.
IV. SHIFT TOWARD A REGULATED MARKET
When asked why it took regulators so long to discover that a
market of this scale was being rigged in such an extraordinary way, a
director of the Financial Conduct Authority, a financial regulatory
body in the United Kingdom answered: “These are not regulated
markets. We have taken swift action as soon as information [about
the misbehavior] came to light . . . . I don’t accept that regulators have
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328. See Financial Reform Newsletter - May 25, 2015, BETTER MKTS. (May 25,
2015), https://www.bettermarkets.com/newsroom/financial-reform-newsletter-may25-2015 [https://perma.cc/X79C-PNZF].
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taken too long.”334 Meanwhile, the FCA charged the banks for
behavior beginning in 2008 and this press conference was held in
2014.335 The CEO of the FCA answered, “It’s a subtle point but it’s
quite an important point . . . . The spot FX market is not a regulated
market. Where it’s not a regulated market, we don’t get regular
reports . . . . We don’t have things we can monitor.”336 The U.S.
Department of Justice charged the banks with the same behavior
dating back to 2007 until 2013.337 For six years, in the largest market
in the world, FX traders at a handful of banks around the world
rigged the price mechanism that is the “anchor to our entire economic
system.”338 A director at the FCA does not even accept the premise
that it took regulators too long to discover this misconduct because
these markets are not regulated.339 The experiment of self-regulation
may have been a valid economic theory at one point. However, the
market has proven that with enough incentive and freedom, even the
greatest of markets will be manipulated. To leave the FX market
unregulated at this point should not be an option up for
consideration.
Multiple goals of financial regulation are at odds here: protection
of individual investors, the integrity of the market, and efficiency.
Advocates against regulation in the spot FX market stress that the
parties are sophisticated, do not need the protection of regulators,
and that the efficiency of the market depends upon its self-regulatory
model.340
While this is true, “no amount of counterparty
sophistication” can protect the market from manipulation or
collusion.341 To cling to the solution of party sophistication is to
simply distract from the real issue at stake. The integrity of the
market and public trust must be protected independently of the
market participants. The regulations imposed on the market will not
be for the purpose of ensuring fairness to the banks’ counterparties in
the spot FX market. It will be to prevent manipulation and to ensure
market integrity. In regards to efficiency, “[e]fficient markets require
certainty, risk, transparency, liquidity and innovation.”342 Regulations
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will at the same time create transparency and public trust in the
market, while not detracting from the risk taking possibilities or the
market’s innovation by simply requiring firms to report their
transactions.
A code of conduct or best practices will not solve the issues facing
the FX market because these solutions have the same inherent
problems that allowed this manipulation scheme to occur. They rely
on the banks to implement them. They, again, allow the banks to
decide when and how to incorporate these principles. The issue was
not with the substance of the code of conduct signed by sixteen banks
in 2001; it was that they didn’t implement it. They didn’t implement it
because it was not mandated, and competing interests fell in favor of
not mandating a non-binding code. There has been important
progress made in the development of a new code of conduct, signed in
March 2015, “but there is a widely held view that little more can be
done to enforce a set of principles upon the market and coerce
participants to behave accordingly.”343 The actors and firms within
this industry will not adhere to any principles, at least for an extended
period of time, unless they are mandated and are a prerequisite to
their participation in the market at all.
This regulation scheme needs to be led by the United States and
United Kingdom.344 The Fair and Effective Markets Review has
already recommended a new civil and criminal market abuse scheme
for regulating the spot FX market. The recommendation includes a
requirement on firms, inter alia, “to keep records of orders and
transactions, and report suspicious cases to the regulator.”345 A
similar regulatory regime is necessary in the United States. The
adoption of a similar regime to the United Kingdom’s will allay
concerns about regulatory arbitrage and fragmentation.
Although it does not present identical concerns as the derivative
instruments, such as betting on future prices, the risk of market
manipulation of the spot markets is proven to be a legitimate and
very real concern. Regulation here will be concerned with protecting
the integrity of the market itself, rather than protecting any individual
investors or market participants from transactions within it. This new
regulatory approach will recognize that the spot market is not solely

343. Trading Codes of Conduct: Going Global, FUTURES & OPTIONS WORLD,
(Aug. 11, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.fow.com/3478865/Trading-codes-of-conductgoing-global.html [https://perma.cc/L2C5-6TYQ].
344. Sixty percent of all forex trades take place in London and New York. BANK
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 13.
345. FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 207, at 14.
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worthy of protection if it serves as a proxy for other derivative
instruments but that it is independently worthy of its own legal
protection.
This Part provides two solutions: (A) a new regulatory regime in
the United States and (B) criminal penalties for manipulation of the
spot FX market.
A. Regulate the Spot Market Explicitly
This new approach recognizes that the spot FX market needs to
come under regulatory jurisdiction, and new regulations need to be
adopted with the goal of effective monitoring and manipulation
prevention. Despite the fact that the banks have paid billions of
dollars in fines, some unquantifiable damage has undisputedly been
done and it is false hope to expect these fines to deter future criminal
behavior of these institutions. Monitoring is necessary to prevent
prolonged manipulation in the first place. Of the U.S. financial
agencies, the CFTC is the most viable candidate to take on this new
role in the spot market. The CFTC already closely monitors FX
futures and forwards and has an aggressive enforcement and market
surveillance program in place.346
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, data on FX swaps must be
reported to new CFTC regulated entities called “swap data
repositories” (SDRs).347 This requirement is intended to “reduce
systemic risk, increase transparency and promote market integrity
within the financial system.”348 SDRs collect real time data of the
creation and continuation of swaps in the FX market and their data is
available to the CFTC at all times.
With the exception of the continuing data, a similar reporting
system or a “spot data repository” would fit the needs of the spot
market as well. This can be done by amending the Commodities
Exchange Act §2(a)(13)(g). The subsection now reads: “Each swap
(whether cleared or uncleared) shall be reported to a registered swap
data repository.”349 Amending this section to state: “Each swap and
FX spot transaction . . . ” would include the spot market within the

346. See Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 109th Cong. (2005),
http://www.cftc.gov/files/opa/opaoverdahl0105.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZF3L-RSHL]
(testimony of James A. Overdahl, Chief Economist, U. S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission).
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reporting requirements that are intended to enhance transparency
and integrity in the opaque OTC markets. This solution would
require “spot data repositories” to collect transaction reports, to keep
necessary records and to report suspicious cases to the CFTC. The
CFTC and the public would have access to this information as well.
The adoption of this new regulatory system for the spot FX market
would not only provide necessary transparency and prevention
measures for market manipulation, but it will also enhance the public
confidence and market integrity in the foreign currency market which
is critical to its success.
B.

Criminal Sanctions

Upon announcement of the bank’s guilty plea, Citigroup CEO
stated that “the behavior . . . is an embarrassment to our firm and
stands in stark contrast to Citi’s values.”350 The banks explained away
their conduct by the bad behavior of a small number of employees.
For example, JPMorgan Chairman and CEO Jamie Dimon stated:
“The lesson here is that the conduct of a small group of employees, or
of even a single employee, can reflect badly on all of us.”351 UBS
CEO Sergio Ermotti and Chairman Axel Weber said: “The conduct
of a small number of employees was unacceptable and we have taken
appropriate disciplinary actions.”352 Barclays CEO Antony Jenkins
stated: “I share the frustration of shareholders and colleagues that
some individuals have once more brought our company and industry
into disrepute.”353 JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon even went so far as
to claim that the “banks are under assault.”354
Even with billions of dollars in fines, though, and criminal felony
pleas, the banks have not experienced any practical repercussions. In
fact, the shares of Barclays and UBS all went up when the DOJ fines
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were announced because their penalties were lower than expected.355
The banks also announced that their guilty pleas are not expected to
have any practical impact on their operations.356 What, then, was the
consequence of rigging the biggest market in the world?
These inconsequential prosecutions are unlikely to create any
illusion that the DOJ takes these offenses seriously enough to actually
cause a deterrent effect. The purpose of such prosecutions is not just
to punish those involved, but to deter the next potential financial
manipulation around the corner.357 The incentive structure needs to
be reversed so that banks will not ultimately profit from manipulating
the market without consequence, and it is the government’s proper
role to step in to impose proper criminal sanctions. Only when
proper criminal sanctions are imposed and prosecuted against the
individuals responsible for this criminal behavior will this conduct be
deterred.
Concerns about a potential chilling effect of legitimate trade
practices can be addressed by requiring that the CFTC or the DOJ
prove manipulative intent as an indispensable element of the offense.
This has already been addressed by one court, which has held in one
instance of securities manipulation that the “SEC must prove that but
for the manipulative intent, the defendant would not have conducted
the transaction.”358 With this but-for requirement, concerns about
legitimate trade activity are severely outweighed by the necessity of
enforcing the anti-manipulation laws that exist.
The Commodities Exchange Act already makes manipulation in
the foreign exchange spot market a felony. Section 2(c)(2)(C)
provides that transactions in foreign exchange shall not be exempt
from the anti-manipulation sections of the CEA, notwithstanding its
exemption otherwise. The issue is that the DOJ has simply chosen
not to enforce it in this particular case. An additional statute would
be redundant, and would not make it more likely that it would be
enforced. The DOJ may be concerned about the element of intent,
and that courts may choose to require fraud in enforcing this statute.
However, the CFTC has already taken the position that this is not
necessary, and courts in the Second Circuit have agreed.
In September 2015, the DOJ issued a memorandum that it would
take a harsher stance against individual executives in white-collar
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crime, where they had not done so before. At this point it will be up
to the DOJ to act on its assertion and to dedicate the resources
necessary to take a critical stance against the individuals actually
committing the crimes corporations have thus far pleaded guilty to.
CONCLUSION
This Note began by explaining how the foreign currency market
began as a fixed market under the Bretton Woods Agreement. With
the collapse of this system, currency rates were allowed to float
against one another and speculation developed into a huge sector of
the FX market.
These derivative instruments and nearly all
international financial markets depend upon spot benchmarks. It was
these benchmarks that a handful of traders at the biggest financial
institutions colluded to manipulate.
Advocates against regulation in the spot FX market stress that the
parties are sophisticated, do not need the protection of regulators,
and that the efficiency of the market depends upon its self-regulatory
model. While this is true, no amount of counterparty sophistication
can protect the market from manipulation or collusion. To cling to
the solution of party sophistication is to simply distract from the real
issue at stake. The integrity of the market and public trust must be
protected independently of the market participants.
In order to achieve this goal, this Note advocates the daily
monitoring of the spot FX market through a system similar, or
identical, to the swap data repositories already in place under Dodd –
Frank. This Note also advocates for the effective enforcement of the
criminal laws already in place in order to create an effective deterrent
to recidivist financial institutions. With these changes implemented,
the forex market will be able to move beyond its current state of the
unregulated “Wild West” into a market of laws and accountability.

